What Is Influencing Financially-Driven Shareholder Activism in the US and UK—Principal-Agent or Principal-Principal Problems? by Muller-Kahle, Maureen I.
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations in Business
Administration College of Business (Strome)
Spring 2010
What Is Influencing Financially-Driven
Shareholder Activism in the US and
UK—Principal-Agent or Principal-Principal
Problems?
Maureen I. Muller-Kahle
Old Dominion University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the
Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business (Strome) at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Muller-Kahle, Maureen I.. "What Is Influencing Financially-Driven Shareholder Activism in the US and UK—Principal-Agent or
Principal-Principal Problems?" (2010). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, , Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/
wd7s-6m89
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds/55
WHAT IS INFLUENCING FINANCIALLY-DRIVEN SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM IN THE US AND THE UK- PRINCIPAL-AGENT OR 
PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS? 
By: 
Maureen I. Muller-Kahle 
B.A. June 1987 University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
M.B.A. June 1990 University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirement for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
May 2010 
Approved by: 
Ajai S. (6aur (Member) 
Anil Nair (Member) 
David Selover (Member) 
ABSTRACT 
WHAT IS INFLUENCING FINANCIALLY DRIVEN SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM IN THE US AND THE UK- PRINCIPAL-AGENT OR 
PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS? 
Maureen I. Muller-Kahle 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Director: Dr. William Q. Judge 
Shareholder activism is a response to corporate underperformance by one or more 
shareholders of the corporation. Classic agency theory suggests that shareholder activism 
is a mechanism to curb principal-agent problems in the firm. However, the principal-
principal perspective suggests that shareholder activism is a mechanism for dominant 
shareholders to extract resources from the firm. This dissertation extends the current 
research by developing and testing competing hypotheses to examine the antecedents of 
financially driven shareholder activism in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The extant literature on financially driven shareholder activism (FDSA) is reviewed, 
research gaps in the literature identified and a new model of shareholder activism is 
introduced. Agency theory and the principal-principal perspective are used to develop 
eight hypotheses, which are empirically tested. 
Findings show that several proxies for the principal-principal perspective are 
better predictors of FDSA than proxies from the principal-agent perspective. The study 
also shows a positive relationship between FDSA and changes in long-term market-based 
performance, a principal-agency prediction. The results also show that the relationship 
between FDSA and change in subsequent firm performance is moderated by governance 
environment. This study provides evidence that the principal-principal problems are not 
just found in emerging market countries as previous studies show, but are also a problem 
in developed countries like the US and the UK. In addition, this study suggests that 
agency theory is limited in its explanatory power. For policymakers, this study questions 
whether shareholder activism can act as an effective method to monitor corporate 
management. 
Co-Directors of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ajai S. Gaur 
Dr. Anil Nair 
Dr. David Selover 
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This dissertation is dedicated to my mother and father for all their support and for 
instilling in me that learning is truly a lifelong process. 
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1 
WHAT IS INFLUENCING FINANCIALLY DRIVEN SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM IN THE US AND THE UK- PRINCIPAL-AGENT OR 
PRINCIPAL-PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS? 
CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
The topic of corporate governance has garnered much attention in the recent past, mostly 
due to the colossal failures of key firms such as Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco. Solomon 
(2007: 14) defines corporate governance as "the system of checks and balances, both 
internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their shareholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of 
their business activity." Shleifer & Vishny (1997:737) have a more narrow definition 
when they state that corporate governance "deals with the ways that in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment." Both 
definitions state the importance of oversight of corporations by shareholders. 
Firms are governed by both internal and external governance mechanisms (Denis 
& McConnell, 2003). Specifically, internal governance mechanisms include the board of 
directors and the ownership structure of the firm, while external governance mechanisms 
are the market for corporate control and the legal system. In the past, agency theory has 
been the dominant perspective in analyzing issues in corporate governance. Agency 
theory suggests that there can be conflicts of interest between principals (shareholders) 
and agents (management) and that monitoring by principals can be difficult or expensive 
(Berle & Means, 1932).' Shareholders' interests are represented by a board of directors 
that is responsible for overseeing the firm's management. 
1
 This dissertation follows the citation and reference formatting of the Academy of Management Journal. 
The principal-agent perspective has received much attention in the literature, yet 
little empirical support (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Monks and Minow 
(1996) suggest that there is a breakdown in the governance system because these internal 
and external governance systems aren't working to curb principal-agent problems, and 
they argue that the shareholders need to be more assertive about proper corporate 
governance. Indeed, anecdotal and systematic research suggests that this may be correct. 
Previous research has shown that boards of directors are generally ineffective as 
monitors, and some types of shareholders who own large blocks of stock are not acting as 
active monitors of the firm (Brickley, Lease & Smith, 1988). Others suggest that the 
enormous size of today's corporations make it very difficult for the takeover market to be 
a major tool of corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, many 
suggest that the legal system is too weak to act as an effective governance mechanism 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Pagano & Volpin, 2005). The 
recent corporate meltdowns of Enron, WorldCom, and Lloyd's are excellent examples 
that the legal system is ineffective. 
One shortcoming of classic agency theory is that it assumes that all shareholders 
have the same objective of maximizing shareholder returns (Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008). On 
the other hand, recent research suggests that principal-principal problems can occur in 
companies whereby there is "incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups 
in a corporation" (Su et al., 2008: 17). Specifically, there may be conflicts of interests 
between large and small shareholders. Previous studies examining the principal-principal 
problem have been largely based in emerging economies where majority shareholders 
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collude with owners to expropriate resources from the firm (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton & Jiang, 2008). 
This dissertation empirically tests the principal-agent and principal-principal 
perspectives within the context of shareholder activism events within developed 
economies. Shareholder activism (or "relational investing") has emerged as a key 
mechanism for enhancing corporate governance in public corporations. Sjostrom (2008: 
142) defines shareholder activism as "the use of ownership position to actively influence 
company policy and practice. Shareholder activism can be exerted through letter writing, 
dialogue with corporate management or the board, asking questions at open sessions in 
general meetings, and through the filing of formal shareholder proposals." In general, 
there are two types of shareholder activism: (1) efforts that are focused on improving 
financial performance; and (2) socially driven activism with the objective of increased 
corporate social responsibility. It is important to distinguish between the two types of 
activism as both the antecedents and effects of activism may be different (Judge, Gaur, & 
Muller-Kahle, 2010). This study focuses on the antecedents and effects of financially 
driven shareholder activism (FDSA), as this type of activism has the most potential to 
impact firm performance. Thus, most of the extant research on financially driven 
shareholder activism attempts to determine if shareholder activism has had an impact on 
firm performance and what types of investors see the highest returns from shareholder 
activism efforts. 
This study develops a competing set of hypotheses to empirically test the classic 
agency principal-agent perspective versus the more recent principal-principal perspective 
and asks the following three research questions. First, what firm characteristics are 
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causing firms to be targeted by financially driven shareholder activism? Specifically, are 
principal-agent problems driving shareholder activism or are principal-principal problems 
causing firms to be targeted by financially driven shareholder activists? Second, does 
financially driven shareholder activism impact firm performance? Agency theory would 
suggest that the firms would see increased firm performance as a result of increased 
monitoring while the principal-principal perspective would suggest that activists acting as 
dominant shareholders extract resources from the firm to benefit their own position and 
negatively impact firm performance. Third, does governance environment play any role 
moderating the effects of shareholder activism? 
Shareholders have three options to express their dissatisfaction with a firm: (1) 
sell their shares, (2) continue to hold their shares and attempt to influence the firm, or (3) 
passively continue to hold their shares in the hope that things will improve over time. 
Option two is the path chosen by shareholder activists in economies where capital 
markets are relatively liquid. However, activism is not costless and only shareholders 
with knowledge and resources can attempt to "voice" their displeasure with 
underperforming corporations (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Admati, Pfeiderer & Zechner, 
1994). Thus, many investors are choosing option two and using shareholder activism 
tactics to express their dissatisfaction with firm operations. On the other hand, there is 
some evidence that some activists such as hedge funds target firms in order to make high 
short-term profits from their shareholder activist tactics (Kulpa, 2005). 
The topic of shareholder activism is both timely and relevant as shareholder 
activism continues to grow not only in the United States, but all around the world. In 
addition, this is the first study empirically testing the principal-principal perspective in 
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the context of shareholder activism in developed economies. Firm managers need to be 
aware of the triggers that will encourage shareholder activists to target firms. The study 
is of importance to shareholders as the causes and effects of shareholder activism are 
largely equivocal. With improved methodology, this study makes a solid contribution to 
the body of knowledge on shareholder activism. Finally, this study is of importance to 
scholars as this is one of the first to incorporate grounded theory into the study of 
shareholder activism. 
Types of shareholder activists 
While any shareholder can engage in shareholder activism, there are three types 
of investors who are garnering much attention from researchers. These investors 
purchase large blocks of shares and attempt to influence corporate governance in the 
firms in which they own shares within and across national economies. They include 
blockholder activists, hedge funds and pension funds. Each of these groups is described 
below. 
Blockholder Activists. These shareholder activists were referred to as "corporate 
raiders" in the 1980's (Faulkner, Mok & Swidler, 1990). Croci (2007: 952) defines a 
corporate raider as "a minority shareholder who was expected to force changes in the 
target firm's corporate policies, and based on his reputation for annoying incumbent 
management." In this paper the term blockholder activists is used to refer to these 
investors who own and operate their own investment companies. For example, Carl 
Icahn, T. Boone Pickens, and George Soros are well known examples of blockholder 
activists. 
6 
Pension Fund Activists. Pension funds are a second group of potential 
shareholder activists. In 2005, pension funds had assets of $8.1 trillion dollars in the US 
and $1.6 trillion dollars in the UK (Pension Benefits, 2006). Pension funds don't have 
the same constraints as mutual funds but are not as mobile as hedge funds. Pension funds 
don't have the same diversification or liquidity requirements as mutual funds, are not 
constrained by performance fees, and don't have the financial conflicts of interest that 
mutual funds and insurance companies have. However, they are constrained as they are 
political entities (Romano, 1993). Kahan and Rock (2006) note that political constraints 
prevent pension funds from being as aggressive as hedge funds in their shareholder 
activism tactics. Furthermore, pension funds are required to make quarterly disclosures 
of their holdings. Last, pension fund managers are not incentivized as aggressively as 
hedge funds managers. 
Hedge Fund Activists. Hedge funds are unique in that they are pooled, privately 
organized investment funds. They are currently unregulated in both the US and the UK 
(Horsfield-Bradbury, 2008) and fund managers can hold larger positions without being 
constrained by diversification requirements. They're also able to stipulate to their 
investors that their funds will be locked up for certain time periods. Hedge fund 
managers are also well compensated with packages that are aligned with company 
performance. Their compensation can be up to 20% of the firm's annualized returns. 
Hedge funds may have a greater ability and motivation than pension funds and mutual 
funds to negotiate with company management. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas (2008) 
found that activist hedge funds tend not to purchase the entire company. Instead, they 
found that the median ownership stake is typically about 10%. They also report that 
hedge funds have a success rate of about 41%, where success is defined by the ability to 
institute the changes they would like to make. 
Governance Environment for Shareholder Activism 
Early studies on shareholder activism point to shareholder activism in the United 
States. As early as 1970, shareholder activists submitted shareholder resolutions at the 
General Motors annual meeting (Vogel, 1983). While shareholder activism is most 
prevalent in the US and UK, it is spreading to other countries due to the globalization of 
the capital markets (Gillan & Starks, 2003). More recently, research has expanded to 
look at shareholder activism outside the United States (Anderson, Ramsay, Marshall & 
Mitchell, 2007; Becht, Franks, Mayer & Rossi, 2009; Hernandez-Lopez, 2003; Lewis & 
Mackenzie, 2000; Naruisch & Liepe, 2007; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000; Seki, 2005; Yen & 
Chen, 2005; Buchanan & Yang, 2009). 
While the UK and the US are both common law countries with dispersed 
ownership and high levels of institutional ownership, there are numerous differences in 
governance environments. First, Aguilera, Williams, Conley, and Rupp (2006) note that 
UK investors are more engaged than US investors as the Cadbury Report (1992) and the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) encourages institutional investors to 
engage in discussions with company management over corporate governance issues. 
Furthermore, UK institutional investors are more likely to be able to meet with company 
management (Holland, 1998). Second, Aguilera et al. (2006) report US investors are 
more impatient than UK institutional investors and turn over their portfolios more 
quickly. Third, it can be argued that UK shareholders have more rights than US 
shareholders. UK shareholders can request an Extraordinary General Meeting with just 
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10% of the shareholder votes. There is no opportunity for US shareholders to call special 
meetings outside the annual shareholders' meeting. UK shareholder proposals are legally 
binding, whereas in the US, shareholder proposals are non-binding. Last, while it is not 
mandatory, most firms in the UK have adopted the recommendation issued by the 
Cadbury Report (1992) to separate the Chairperson and CEO roles. Aguilera et al. (2006) 
note that the majority of UK companies have separated the Chair and CEO roles while 
the majority of US companies have continued to combine the two roles. In their case 
study of shareholder activism by UK asset management companies, Hendry, Sanderson, 
Barker and Roberts (2007) report that activism by institutional investors in the UK is 
growing. 
Previous Research on Shareholder Activism 
Most of the prior work on shareholder activism has been conducted by the finance 
and legal fields and is driven by archival data. In general, there are three major types of 
studies. First, a large number of researchers study shareholder activism via the analysis 
of proxy resolutions in the US (see Romano [2001] for a review). Success is measured by 
the percentage of proxy votes received or via event studies which examine stock market 
reactions to the announcement of proxy resolutions. Second, another body of research 
examines pension funds that put target firms on publicized focus lists (Crutchley, Hudson 
& Jensen, 1998; Opler & Sokobin, 1998; Caton, Goh & Donaldson, 2001; Song & 
Szewczyk, 2003; English, Smythe & McNeil, 2004; Wu, 2004; Anson, White & Ho, 
2003; 2004; Nelson, 2005; Barber, 2006; Nelson, 2006). Shareholder activism effects are 
again measured via event studies measuring the impact of the announcement of a firm 
being placed on a focus list. Third, some researchers track activism in the US by 
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Schedule 13D filings, which a firm is required to file with the SEC after purchasing a 5% 
or greater stake in the firm (see Klein & Zur, 2006; Boyson & Mooradian, 2007; Bratton, 
2007; Greenwood & Schor, 2007; Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008). Similar to previous 
studies success is measured with event studies. 
A thorough review reveals numerous gaps in the literature on shareholder 
activism. First, while we have some understanding of the antecedents of shareholder 
activism from the published literature, there has not been a thorough study of what is 
driving shareholder activism since previous research has focused on the effects of 
activism. Second, while the principal-agent perspective of agency theory has been 
utilized in many studies, the principal-principal perspective is largely untested in 
developed economies due to the theoretical assumption that such conflict does not occur. 
Third, the majority of prior research measures short-term firm performance via event 
studies (Faulkener et al., 1990; Wahal, 1996; Bethel, Liebeskind & Opler, 1998; 
Carleton, Nelson & Weisbach,1998; Caton et al., 2001; Anson et al., 2003; English, 
Smythe & McNeil, 2004; Nelson, 2005; Barber, 2006; Klein & Zur, 2006; Renneboog & 
Szilagyi, 2006; Croci, 2007; Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Del Guercio, Seery & 
Woidtke, 2008; Prevost, Rao & Williams, 2009). More research is needed about the 
long-term impact of shareholder activism on firm performance. Fourth, almost all the 
previous research is focused on activism in the US (Gillan & Starks, 2003). Becht et al. 
(2009) examined UK pension funds and suggest that the legal environment of each 
country may impact the level and effectiveness of shareholder activism. Thus, 
governance environments of different countries may encourage or discourage shareholder 
10 
activism. Consequently, additional research is needed on shareholder activism in 
countries other than the US. 
This study is organized in the following manner. In Chapter II, the extant 
literature on shareholder activism is reviewed and research gaps are identified. A 
conceptual model of the causes and effects of shareholder activism is presented and 
salient features described. Next, research hypotheses are developed to empirically test 
whether principal-agent or principal-principal drivers are causing financially driven 
shareholder activism within the firm and whether financially driven shareholder activism 
has a positive or negative impact on firm performance. In Chapter III, the methodology is 
presented with details on the research design, sample, operationalization of the variables 
and the plan for data analysis. In Chapter IV, the empirical findings of the analyses are 
presented. Chapter V discusses the results and their implications. Suggestions for future 
research are also discussed along with limitations of the study and final conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL 
In this chapter, the history of shareholder activism is briefly outlined and a thorough 
review of the literature relating to the causes and effects of shareholder activism is 
conducted. The following literature review is divided into three sections. First, prior 
literature on the antecedents of shareholder activism is reviewed. Second, prior literature 
on the effects of shareholder activism is examined. Third, while the bulk of shareholder 
activism research has been conducted using US companies, the extant research on 
shareholder activism outside the US is also reviewed. 
Research gaps are then identified with theoretical foundations that can be used in 
shareholder activism research. A new model of antecedents and effects of financially 
driven shareholder activism is presented using competing theories. Finally, research 
hypotheses are introduced which are empirically tested in Chapter IV after a discussion 
on research methodology in Chapter III. 
History of Shareholder Activism 
Before examining the prior literature examining the causes and effects of 
shareholder activism, one finds that shareholder activism has evolved over time. Gillan 
and Starks (2007) and Marens (2002) trace the history of shareholder activism in the 
United States. Gillan and Starks (2007) note that US financial institutions were the 
primary outside monitors of US firms in the early 1900's. With the crash of 1929, the 
government began to limit the role of the financial institutions in corporate governance. 
Gillan and Starks (2007) state that laws and regulations passed by the US government led 
12 
to a widening gap between shareholders and control. In 1942, the SEC first allowed 
proxy resolutions, and most shareholder activism was conducted by individual investors. 
This led to the emergence of the so-called gadflies who attended annual shareholder 
meetings to voice their disapproval on issues of governance, labor, and corporate social 
responsibility. Marens (2002) writes that these gadflies included individual investors 
and union leadership. Some of the more well-known gadflies included Lewis and John 
Gilbert, who are regarded as two of the early proxy resolution pioneers, and Wilma Soss, 
who founded the Federation of Women Shareholders. Lewis Gilbert began six decades 
of activism with his attendance of the 1932 shareholder meeting of Consolidated Gas 
Company (Talner, 1983). Marens (2002) notes that these early shareholder activists were 
able to garner attention for future discussions on expanding ownership rights. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the shareholder activism literature. In the 
1980's, shareholder activism was mostly in response to the emergence of corporate 
raiders and management teams who were paying greenmail to fend off takeovers 
(Marens, 2002; Gillan & Starks, 2007). The 1980s were also the first time institutional 
investors began to get involved in shareholder activism. At this time, the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) began to get more active in shareholder 
activism. Empirical work on shareholder activism was also in its infancy. 
In the 1990's, US regulatory changes brought increased levels of activism. There 
was a movement away from full takeovers to a more politically based type of shareholder 
activism (Black, 1992; Pound, 1992). In 1992, the SEC changed its regulations on proxy 
resolutions, making it easier to get a proxy resolution on the ballot to be voted on during 
an annual shareholder meeting. 
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In the UK, a weak governance environment in the 1980's characterized by 
ineffective monitoring by UK boards (Florackis & Ozkan, 2004) and concerns about 
managerial behavior (Toms & Wright, 2005) led to numerous voluntary guidelines being 
introduced starting with the Cadbury Report (1992). 
In their study of US proxy resolutions from 1988 to 1998, Graves, Rehbein and 
Waddock (2001) report that governance related resolutions did not appear on proxy 
resolutions until 1993 but have grown steadily since then. They also report that 
compensation-related activism via proxy resolutions did not start until 1995. In addition, 
labor union pension funds and hedge funds began to get more active in financially driven 
activism. Takeover activity by corporate raiders slowed down (Gillan & Starks, 2007). 
During the last fifteen years, there have been four major changes that have 
impacted shareholder activism. The first change is the continued growth of institutional 
investor ownership. Gillan and Starks (2007) note that institutional investor ownership in 
the US was approximately 10% in 1953 and reached over 60% by 2005. In the UK, 
institutional investor ownership is even higher at over 80% (ONS, 2007). The second 
change is the increased use of proxy resolutions by all types of investors. The number of 
proxy resolutions from 1987 to 1994 grew to 2,042 from 1,730 for the period between 
2001 and 2005 (Gillan & Starks, 2007). 
The third change is the tremendous growth of the hedge fund industry in the last 
decade. As of 2006, there were 8,000 hedge funds with over $1 trillion under 
management (Economist, 2006:78). Kahan and Rock (2006) report that hedge funds are 
different from other types of shareholder activists because of their structure, operations 
and objectives. They do not operate under the same regulatory and political constraints 
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on the other types of activists. They have few conflicts of interest and their managers are 
extremely well compensated. They have been accused of being too short-term focused at 
the expense of the long-term profitability of their target firms. 
The fourth change is that investors must file a schedule 13D with the SEC after 
they have purchased a 5% or higher stake in a US company and must state their future 
intentions as more active investors. Thus, many recent studies on activism in the US 
have tracked shareholder activism after a schedule 13D filing has occurred. 
In summary, over the years, shareholder activism research has been almost 
entirely focused on US-based firms. There is only one published study of shareholder 
activism in the UK. Becht et al. (2009) performed a case study on the Hermes UK Focus 
Fund, a pension fund owned by British Telecom, and had insider access to company 
records. 
Antecedents of Shareholder Activism 
In this section, previous literature focusing on the antecedents and effects of 
shareholder activism is reviewed. Looking at antecedents of shareholder activism, there 
are four areas within a firm in which researchers have found antecedents of shareholder 
activism: the firm, the CEO, the board of directors and ownership. First, firm 
characteristics such as prior firm performance, firm size, amount of diversification, 
growth prospects, and levels of free cash flow are the most commonly studied 
antecedents of shareholder activism. Only a few studies have looked at how shareholder 
activism could be driven by ownership structure. 
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Firm characteristics 
Prior Firm Performance. Numerous US-based studies have found that the prior 
performance of firms has led shareholder activists to target firms. Studies have 
measured firm performance with market based measures and financial measures. 
Predominantly, most types of activists target firms with poor performance or for being 
undervalued via measures like book to market or Tobin's Q. However, Klein and Zur 
(2006) did find evidence that US hedge funds in their sample targeted profitable firms. 
A few studies used proxy resolutions as the mechanism of shareholder activism 
and found evidence that multiple types of investor groups target companies due to 
performance issues. Bizjak and Marquette (1998) studied multiple types of activists who 
were using shareholder resolutions in an effort to remove poison pills in target firms. 
With a sample of 193 resolutions in the US involving poison pills from 1986 to 1993, 
they found that poor performance by target companies and making management 
resistance to restructuring or removing their poison pills was a predictor of FDSA. 
Johnson and Shackell-Dowell (1997) conducted a study of 169 executive 
compensation proposals made by 74 shareholder activists against 106 US firms from 
1992 to 1995. They found that poor performance led to firms being targeted by gadflies 
and institutional investors. 
Choi's (2000) study of 361 proxy resolutions targeting 277 US companies from 
1991 to 1995 found that poor stock performance was driving the issuance of proxy 
resolutions. Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) studied proxy contests for board seats 
between 1979 and 1994. In their sample of 270 US proxy contests, they found that firms 
with poor performance were more likely to be targeted for a proxy contest effort. 
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Thomas et al. (2005) examined 1,454 proxy resolutions in the US from 2000 to 2004 and 
found that poor performance was also driving shareholder activism efforts. Renneboog 
and Szilagyi (2006) used a sample of 2,800 shareholder proposals in the US from 1996 to 
2005 and also found that shareholder activists targeted underperforming companies. 
More recently, Buchanan and Yang (2009) studied US and UK shareholder 
proposals from 2000 to 2006 with 3,812 proposals at 764 US firms and 508 proposals at 
85 UK firms and found that shareholder activists target firms with low book to market 
ratios. 
Other studies looked at shareholder activism efforts of investor groups like the US 
Shareholders Association and the Council of Institutional Investors. Strickland, Wiles 
and Zenner (1996) examined shareholder activism efforts of the US Shareholders 
Association. Their sample consisted of 216 proposals at 85 US firms between 1990 and 
1993. They found that poor stock performance was a key antecedent of shareholder 
activism. Opler and Sokobin (1998) and Caton et al. (2001) both use samples derived by 
shareholder activism targets of the Council of Institutional Investors. Opler and 
Sokobin's (1998) sample was 96 US firms from 1991 to 1993 and Caton et al.'s (2001) 
sample was 138 US companies from 1991 to 1995. Both studies found that the Council 
of Institutional Investors targeted firms with poor stock performance. 
Among blockholder activists, Bethel et al. (1998) examined block share purchases 
in the 1980's and focused on investors like Carl Icahn, Jacobs S. Brothers, Mario Cavalli 
and George Soros. Like many other studies, they found that these US activists almost 
always target firms which are not meeting financial performance targets. In their study, 
performance was measured by low profitability as measured by ROA and low market to 
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book values. Their sample consisted of 151 activist block purchases of 5% or greater 
equity stake made during the 1980's. 
Croci (2007) studied blockholder activists in Europe using a sample of 136 
investments made in France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK by 15 blockholder 
activists from 1990 to 2001. He found that blockholder activists targeted firms with 
lower book to market values. 
A number of researchers have found a negative relationship between prior firm 
performance and shareholder activism among pension funds. There were four studies 
that have focused on shareholder activism of multiple US-based pension funds. First, 
Wahal (1996) looked at shareholder activism efforts of nine large US pension funds via 
proxy resolutions, letters, and meetings using a sample of 356 targets within 146 firms 
from 1987 to 1993 and found they often targeted poor performing firms. Second, 
Karpoff, Malatesta and Walking (1996) examined 269 US companies facing 522 
shareholder resolutions from 1986 to 1990 and found that many shareholder resolutions 
by a mix of public and private investor groups and individual investors were targeted at 
companies with poor performance. Third, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) studied 266 
proxy resolutions at 125 firms by the five largest US pension funds from 1987 to 1993 
and found that some, but not all, of the pension funds targeted firms with poor 
performance. Last, the Del Guercio et al. (2008) study focused on "just vote no" proxy 
resolutions issued by public pension funds. Their sample included 112 just vote no 
campaigns in the US from 1990 to 2003 and found that public pension funds targeted 
firms with poor firm performance. 
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Shareholder activism by the US-based CalPERS pension fund has also been 
widely studied. Nesbitt (1994) looked at 42 investments made by the CalPERS pension 
fund from 1987 to 1992 and found that CalPERS targeted underperforming companies 
using market-based performance measures. All of the following studies found that 
CalPERS targeted firms with poor stock price performance. Smith (1996) studied 
shareholder activism efforts by CalPERS using a sample of 51 firms targeted by 
CalPERS from 1987 to 1993. Crutchley et al. (1998) studied public announcements 
made by CalPERS announcing the firms who were on their focus list. Their sample 
included 47 firms targeted by CalPERS from 1992 to 1997. In 2004, English et al. also 
studied 63 targets in 43 firms from 1992 to 1997 that were placed on the CalPERS focus 
list. Last, Wu (2004) looked at 37 firms from 1988 to 1995 that were on the CalPERS 
focus list. 
Finally, Becht et al. (2009) looked at shareholder activism in the UK by one 
pension fund, the Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUKFF), from 1998 to 2004. In 2005, 
HUKFF had 61 billion pounds under management. Their sample consisted of 41 
companies of which the fund had discussions with 30. UK laws require companies make 
a public disclosure when they have acquired just 3% of the firm shares. Becht et al.'s 
(2009) main innovation is the study of one fund with full insider access to records of the 
fund's activities. According to internal documents, one of the three criteria for targeting 
firms is that the firm is underperforming. 
Looking at hedge funds, four studies found that prior firm performance impacted 
US hedge funds decision to target a firm. Many of these studies used measures of 
Tobin's Q as an indicator of a firm's market performance. Tobin's Q is defined as the 
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market value of a firm's assets divided by the replacement costs of a firm's assets 
(Brainard & Tobin, 1968). If a firm has a Q value of greater than one, it presumes the 
existence of intangible assets which bring up the value of the firm above and beyond the 
value of its physical assets. Doukas (1995) suggests that well-managed firms have a 
Tobin's Q value of over one and poorly-managed firms have Tobin's Q values less than 
one. Hedge funds often consider Q values to identify and target poorly managed firms. 
Boyson and Mooradian (2007) looked at US hedge funds from 1994 to 2005 with a 
sample of 111 hedge funds and 89 hedge fund management companies and 397 target 
firms. They found that the hedge funds in their sample targeted firms with low measures 
of Tobin's Q and low stock performance. Greenwood and Schor (2007) found that US 
hedge funds targeted firms with low market-to-book ratios and those who were 
underperforming in their industry. They also show that hedge funds target firms with 
lower long-term industry abnormal returns funds using a sample of 784 hedge funds from 
1993 to 2006. Brav et al. (2008) looked at shareholder activism by US hedge funds and 
used a sample of 888 events by 131 activist hedge funds from 2001 through 2005. They 
find that hedge funds target companies with low market value relative to book value. 
More recently, a study on hedge funds in Germany finds that hedge funds target firms 
with declining profitability (Bessler, Drobetz & Holler, 2008) 
Surprisingly, Klein and Zur's (2006) study was the only one that found that hedge 
funds were more likely to target cash-rich, profitable firms. They tracked 155 firms 
targeted by US hedge funds from 2003 to 2005. They note that hedge funds target 
profitable firms with the goal of short term gains via increased dividend payouts and 
short-term increases in stock price. The shareholder activism literature clearly points to 
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firms being targeted by numerous types of shareholder activists for poor firm 
performance. 
Firm size. Previous activism research also suggests that there may be a 
relationship between firm size and the likelihood of shareholder activism. However, 
empirical results find support for both positive and negative effects. The following four 
US-based studies find support for shareholder activists targeting larger firms. Three of 
the four studies examined pension fund activism. Smith (1996) studied CalPERS 
activism, while Del Guercio et al. (2008) studied "just vote no" campaigns on proxy 
resolutions, and Carleton et al. (1998) looked at 65 targets in 45 firms targeted by the 
pension fund TIAA-CREFF from 1992 to 1996. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2006) 
studied over 2,800 shareholder proposals by various types of activists from 1996 to 2005 
and found that large firms were targeted by shareholder activists. 
While many of the studies found support for activists targeting smaller firms, 
studies on shareholder activism by blockholder activists and hedge funds find that these 
activists tend to target smaller firms in order to be able to purchase a 5% or larger share 
of equity in the target company. Bethel et al. (1998) found that the activist blockholders 
of the 1980's targeted smaller firms. Woidtke (2002) found that pension fund activists 
were more likely to target smaller firms than larger firms in the US. Faccio and Lasfer 
(2000) find that UK pension funds tended to target smaller firms when engaging in 
activist efforts through block share purchases. Boyson and Mooradian (2007), Bratton 
(2007) and Greenwood and Schor (2007) found that hedge fund activists prefer smaller 
firms as target firms in the US. One potential reason for this relationship is that 
financially driven activists may prefer to limit the cost of activism and that smaller firms 
32 
are expected to cost less to prod into taking action. In addition, larger firms have the 
resources and political connections to resist shareholder activism (Hibbard, 2005). 
Free cash flow. Free cash flow is excess cash that could be distributed to 
shareholders in the form of extra dividends. Bratton (2007) examined a sample of 130 
domestic firms between 2002 and 2006 that were targeted by hedge funds and found that 
many target companies have high levels of free cash flow. Bratton (2007) defines high 
levels of cash flow as cash to total assets ratio of 0.15 or greater plus a cash-to-debt ratio 
of 0.50 or greater. Bratton (2007) finds that 38% of the target firms in the sample are 
cash rich. Brav et al. (2008) also finds that hedge funds target firms with high levels of 
excess cash. 
It is a classic agency argument that high levels of free cash flow create agency 
problems in that managers can invest in low net present value projects (Griffin & 
Wiggins, 1992; Cuthbertson & Gasparro, 1995) Jensen (1986) argues that high levels of 
free cash flow create agency problems between shareholders and managers over whether 
excess cash should be used within the firm or redistributed to shareholders in the form of 
dividends or share buybacks. However from a principal-principal perspective, high 
levels of cash flow enable easy extraction of assets from the firm in the form of increased 
dividend payouts. 
Board of Director Characteristics 
There are only a handful of studies that have found empirical evidence of links 
between board of director characteristics and shareholder activism. These studies 
examined board composition (i.e., the make-up of insiders versus outsiders serving on the 
board), CEO duality, and board of director size. Only three studies examined how board 
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structure may be a cause of shareholder activism, and the empirical results find support 
that shareholder activists target firms with a higher percentage of insiders. First, Wahal 
(1996) finds that the nine largest US pension funds target firms with high percentages of 
insiders on the board of directors. Second, Akyol and Carroll (2006) find that US firms 
targeted for poison pill removal were more likely to act when the board of directors had a 
higher percentage of outsiders. Third, Buchanan and Yang (2009) in their study of US 
and UK shareholder proposals present contradictory findings and find that activists target 
firms with high percentages of outsiders on the board. 
Wu (2004) found evidence that board of director size is an antecedent of 
shareholder activism by the CalPERS pension fund. He found that CalPERS was more 
likely to include a firm on its focus list if the total number of board members was under 5 
or over 15. Buchanan and Yang (2009) show a positive relationship between board size 
and activism in their sample of UK and US shareholder proposals. 
Finally, Wahal (1996) and Buchanan and Yang (2009) also looked at the issue of 
CEO duality, which occurs when the CEO also holds the Chairperson of the Board 
position. Wahal (1996) found that US pension funds were more likely to target firms that 
had CEO duality, and Buchanan and Yang (2009) found similar results in their sample of 
US and UK shareholder proposals. 
In conclusion, only a limited number of studies examined whether board structure 
or other board of director characteristics may be causing firms to be targeted by 
shareholder activists. However, the findings require consideration in our research. In the 
next section, evidence of ownership characteristics and shareholder activism are 
examined. 
34 
Ownership Structure 
Prior studies have looked at whether shareholder activists have targeted firms 
because of their ownership structures. Specifically, some work has looked at levels of 
institutional ownership and/or insider ownership as a predictor of shareholder activism. 
Stickland et al. (1996) found that firms targeted by the US Shareholders Association were 
more likely to be targeted if they had high levels of institutional ownership. Bizjak and 
Marquette (1998) found that poison pill resolutions were more likely to be put forward 
when block ownership was low. Carleton et al. (1998) found evidence of some 
bandwagon effects as the pension fund, TIAA-CREFF, was more likely to target firms 
that had a concentrated ownership of activist institutions. 
Three studies looked at insider ownership as an antecedent of shareholder 
activism. Bethel et al. (1998) found that firms with low insider ownership are more 
likely to be targeted among activist blockholders. Both Bizjak and Marquette (1998) and 
Akyol and Carroll (2006) studied proxy resolutions directed at poison pill removal and 
both found that insider shareholding was negatively associated with activists' efforts to 
remove poison pills via proxy resolutions and negotiations. 
Again, relatively little is known about how ownership characteristics of firms lead 
them to be targeted by shareholder activists. To the best of the author's knowledge, there 
is no prior research that has looked at UK firms. Next, the literature on the effects of 
shareholder activism is explored. 
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Effects of shareholder activism 
In this section, the prior literature looking at the effects of shareholder activism is 
reviewed. The bulk of the studies on shareholder activism have examined the impact of 
shareholder activism on firm performance. Prior literature has also examined effects 
such as turnover in the top management team and board of director ranks, acquisition of 
board seats, changes to board composition or size, executive compensation, and strategic 
changes such as acquisitions or divestments, and changes to the company's handling of 
excess cash via dividend payouts and/or stock repurchases. 
Activism's Impact on Firm Performance. 
The activism literature shows equivocal results of shareholder activism's impact 
on either short-term or long-term financial results using either market-based or 
accounting-based measures. Short-term market-based returns focus on cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR's) around the announcement window after an activist "goes 
public" with his or her dissatisfaction or after an activist files a schedule 13D with the 
SEC indicating that the activist has purchased a 5% equity stake. Typically, short-term 
market based performance measures changes in market-based performance up to 90 days 
after the announcement. Measures of long-term performance typically report returns one 
year or more after the activist announcement of proxy resolution or an equity purchase 
using accounting-based and/or market-based measures. 
Many researchers have found no impact on firm performance. Three literature 
reviews conducted by Black (1998), Romano (2001) and Karpoff (2001) report 
insignificant effects on firm performance. Black (1998) examines shareholder activism 
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by institutional investors, Romano (2001) reviews nine studies of pension funds and 
investment groups and Karpoff (2001) reviews 25 studies from 1994 to 2001. 
Impacts on Short-term Market-based Firm Performance. Many researchers 
use event studies and attempt to capture CAR's around the announcement of a proxy 
resolution, purchase a 5% equity stake, or that a particular firm has been placed on a 
pension fund's focus list. Again, past research has been primarily US-based unless noted 
otherwise. Looking at shareholder activism by activist blockholders, short term returns 
are largely positive. Faulkener et al. (1990) find short-term CAR's of 2.8% after the 
announcement and 81 day returns of 11.74%. Bethel et al. (1998) find short term stock 
gains upon the announcement of the purchase of 5% or greater equity stake. Finally, 
Croci's (2007) study of blockholder activists in Europe finds positive CARs upon 
announcement of acquisition by a blockholder activist. 
Short-term return results are mixed for two studies that looked at investor groups. 
While Strickland et al. (1996) find positive CAR's for firms targeted by the US 
Shareholders Association, Caton et al. (2001) report negative CAR's upon the 
announcement of being placed on a Council of Institutional Investor target list. 
Examining the research on pension funds, the impact on short-term returns is 
equivocal. Wahal (1996), Carleton et al. (1998) and Nelson (2005) find no evidence of 
CAR's. Other researchers measuring CAR's upon the announcement of being placed on 
a CalPERS focus list find positive returns (Anson et al., 2003; English et al., 2004, 
Barber, 2006). Nelson (2005) argues that the Anson et al. (2003) study contains many 
methodological flaws and that the researchers in this study are also CalPERS employees 
and could have conflict of interest. 
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On the whole, hedge funds achieve positive CAR's upon the announcement of the 
13D filing signifying an equity purchase of 5% or more. Klein and Zur (2006) report a 
CAR of 10.3% after a 13D filing. Bratton (2007) finds positive CAR's in the first three 
days around the announcement of a block purchase. Brav et al. (2008) show large 
positive average abnormal returns between 5% and 7% during the announcement 
window. Finally, Clifford (2008) finds excess returns of 3.39% after announcement of 
the 13D filing. 
Mixed results are also found when examining other studies looking at proxy 
resolutions filed by multiple types of activists. Renneboog and Szilagyi's (2006) study of 
2,800 proxy resolutions and Del Guercio et al.'s (2008) "just vote no" proxy resolution 
study both found small positive CARs upon announcement that a proxy resolution had 
been filed. However, Prevost et al. (2009) find no short term returns upon announcement 
of a proxy filing by labor unions. 
Impacts on Long-term Market-based Firm Performance. Examining the 
studies that consider market-based performance of a year or longer, again the findings are 
largely equivocal. Again, all the studies were US-based unless otherwise noted. Three 
studies looking at the impact of shareholder resolutions by all types of investors generally 
find no impact on stock price. Karpoff et al. (1996) and Thomas et al. (2005) both find 
no change in shareholder returns as a result of proxy resolutions issued. While Gillan and 
Starks (2000) find no short-term impact on stock price, they report positive one-year 
share returns as result of proxy resolutions issued. Their sample consisted of 2,042 proxy 
resolutions submitted at 451 US companies from 1987 to 1994. Buchanan and Yang 
(2009) report positive one year stock returns for their US sample of proxy resolutions. 
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Only one study examined market-based performance over longer periods. Opler 
and Sobokin (1998) examined shareholder activism efforts of the Council of Institutional 
Investors and found that they were able to generate a positive one year average share 
returns of 11.6%. 
On the other hand, researchers studying blockholder activists report positive gains 
using market-based performance measures. Bethel et al. (1998) show short-term stock 
gains. Croci (2007), examining blockholder activists in Europe, finds that these activists 
were able to generate positive long-term gains. Furthermore, when these activists sell 
their stakes, they see better results when they have smaller ownership shares in these 
companies. 
Looking at pension funds, the results are once again equivocal. Four studies 
report no evidence of changes in shareholder value in either the short or long term 
(Wahal, 1996; Smith, 1996; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Faccio & Lasfer, 2000). 
An examination of the studies on the CalPERS pension fund shows the findings 
are mixed. Smith (1996) finds no impact on shareholder value in the short or long term 
based on his sample of 51 firms targeted by CalPERS from 1987 to 1993. Yet, other 
researchers focusing on the CalPERS pension fund report positive gains in shareholder 
value. Nesbitt (1994) examined 42 investments made by CalPERS from 1987 to 1992 
and found market based performance increases of 41%. In addition, Anson et al. (2003) 
show significant returns of 59% in the year following the release of the CalPERS list of 
targeted firms. Their sample includes firms placed on the focus list from 1992 to 2001. 
More recently, Barber (2006) examined a sample of 115 firms from 1990 to 2005 that 
were placed on the CalPERS target list and his results show both short-term and long-
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term market-based gains. While short-term gains were small but significant, five-year 
gains outperformed the market by 32%. 
Finally, research on hedge fund activism also report inconclusive market-based 
performance effects. Klein and Zur (2006) find a decline in earnings-per-share one year 
after the purchase of 5% equity stake by hedge funds. On the other hand, Boy son and 
Mooradian (2007) and Bessler et al. (2008) find both positive by hedge funds on both 
short and long-term market-based performance. 
Impacts on Accounting-based Firm Performance. While most studies have 
focused on market-based measures of performance, a few studies have looked at 
accounting-based measures of performance as indicators of the effects of shareholder 
activism. Typically, accounting-based performance is based on annual figures. Overall, 
the results are mixed. 
In their study of activist blockholders, Bethel et al. (1998) find long-term gains in 
ROA three years after blockholder activists in the 1980's purchased a 5% or larger equity 
stake. Two studies looking at pension fund performance find no evidence of changes in 
accounting-based performance measures (Wahal 1996; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999). 
The findings on performance effects of hedge fund activism are also mixed. 
Klein and Zur (2006) report declines in both ROA and ROE one year after the 5% equity 
stake purchase. However, two studies found positive results. First, Brav et al. (2008) 
find that firms targeted by hedge funds see increases in ROE and ROA. Second, Clifford 
(2008) reports a large positive increase of 1.22% in ROA in the year following the 
acquisition. 
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Studies of Shareholder Activism Outside the US. 
There are just a handful of studies focusing on shareholder activism in settings 
outside of the United States. Many are descriptive in nature (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000; 
Lewis & Mackenzie, 2000; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Amao & Amaeshi, 2008) or are case 
studies (Hernandez-Lopez, 2003; Kruse, 2007; Anderson et al., 2007; Hendry et al., 
2007). Four studies are noteworthy. First, Croci (2007) examines blockholder activist 
activity in Europe from 1990-2001 and finds that blockholder activists see higher returns 
when they have smaller ownership stakes. Second, Faccio and Lasfers (2000) examine 
the monitoring capability of UK pension funds and they conclude that UK pension funds 
have been ineffective monitors. Third, Becht et al. (2009) conduct an in-depth case study 
of the Hermes Focus Fund UK, a UK-based investment fund that engages in shareholder 
activism. They tracked 41 investments made by the fund and had access to the 
company's management and internal documents. Their findings show improvements in 
operating returns and top management team turnover as a result of shareholder activism 
efforts. Finally, Buchanan and Yang (2009) track US and UK shareholder proposals 
from 2000 to 2006 (3,812 proposals at 764 US firms and 508 proposals at 85 UK firms). 
They show one year stock price gains in the US sample, but not the UK sample. One 
possibility for this result is the small sample size. 
Summary of the Literature on Shareholder Activism 
Based on the review of the literature in the prior section, several important points 
can be raised. First, most of the prior literature on shareholder activism has been driven 
by the finance and legal disciplines and is lacking an overarching theoretical foundation 
to explain the antecedents and effects of shareholder activism other than agency theory, 
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which has received modest empirical support. Thus, future research needs to utilize 
multiple theoretical perspectives in order to develop and test a theory explaining the 
causes and effects of shareholder activism. 
Second, the bulk of the studies are based on US shareholder activism. Very little 
is known about activism in other countries. There is much opportunity to learn about 
shareholder activism in other countries. Specifically, no one has compared the impact of 
governance environments on either the incidence and/or effects of shareholder activism. 
Future work needs to determine whether governance environments impact the level of 
shareholder activism experienced by firms and whether governance environments have 
any impact on the effects of shareholder activism. 
Third, the results of examining the effects of shareholder activism are also largely 
equivocal. The bulk of studies concentrate on measuring short-term market-based 
performance effects upon the announcement of an activism effort. There are very few 
studies on the longer term impact of shareholder activism using accounting and market-
based measures, and their results are mixed. More studies are needed to measure the 
longer term impact of shareholder activism on firm performance measures. 
Fourth, there may be methodological problems which are clouding results of 
shareholder activism studies. For example, many of the empirical studies are descriptive 
in nature. More sophisticated statistical models would add much to the validity and 
reliability of the results. A more comprehensive approach to the study of shareholder 
activism is warranted. Additionally, some studies suffer from methodological problems. 
For example, many other studies that calculate CAR's use vastly different empirical 
methods to calculate return. Nelson (2006) argues that four prior studies examining 
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shareholder returns around the release of the CalPERS focus list had methodology 
problems which severely impact their results. Thus, this suggests the need for more 
refined measurement models of shareholder activism. 
Third, there are two types of shareholder activism and previous studies may not 
have clearly delineated between financially driven shareholder activism and socially-
driven shareholder activism. A large portion of proxy resolutions have initiatives that 
center on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Furthermore, some pension funds put 
pressure on target firms to improve their CSR practices. Thus, studies attempting to 
measure financially related effects of shareholder activism may not find any impact on 
the financial performance or corporate governance measures due to the presence of 
socially driven shareholder activism. For example, Woidke (2002) finds that privately 
owned pension funds are more focused on performance while publicly owned pension 
funds are more focused on social issues. Finally, many studies used matched pair 
samples comparing one firm that is experiencing shareholder activism to another similar 
firm that is not being targeted for shareholder activism. Methodologically, it may be 
more appropriate to conduct a larger scale study instead of just utilizing a matched pair 
sample. 
In summary, a large scale study on shareholder activism using multiple theoretical 
perspectives is needed to synthesize the prior literature and provide guidance for future 
research. In the next section, a new research model of shareholder activism is introduced 
utilizing principal-agency and principal-principal perspectives. 
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Theoretical Foundations of Shareholder Activism 
The underlying theoretical foundation in the study of shareholder activism so far 
is agency theory. The central tenet of agency theory is an overarching concern about the 
divergence of interests between principals and agents (Berle & Means, 1932; Jenson & 
Meckling, 1976). However, agency theory fails to explain the potential conflicts of 
interests between shareholders. FDSA's may have different objectives for their target 
firms than other shareholders. Thus, the principal-agent and principal-principal 
perspectives are both used to determine what is driving financially driven shareholder 
activism in the US and the UK-
Principal-Agent Perspective 
Turning first to agency theory, Berle and Means (1932) laid the foundations for 
future work in agency theory when they identified the problems that could occur when 
ownership of the firm is separated from the control of the firm. Berle and Means (1932) 
trace the growth of the American corporation from a single proprietorship to a public 
corporation and suggest that this new structure was likely to give rise to problems of 
ownership and control. In that transition, control of the corporation is placed in the hands 
of professional managers who have little or no ownership interest. As a result, there is 
the fear that managers may be acting in their own self-interest instead of the interests of 
the corporation. Thus, opportunistic managerial decision-making could adversely impact 
company performance. 
The presumption of opportunistic behavior by managers gave rise to agency 
theory, which was further enhanced by the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Fama and Jenson (1983) who posit that managers may misuse corporate assets for their 
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own personal benefit, at the expense of shareholders, causing principal-agent issues. 
Thus, agency costs can diminish corporate performance. As a result, agency theory logic 
would suggest that shareholder activism is one external control option for owners who 
are dissatisfied with the management of their assets. 
The first line of defense against managerial opportunism is a board of directors 
who closely monitor the activities of the top management team. The rise of shareholder 
activism may be in part due to the failure of the board of directors to monitor and 
discipline top management. The board of directors also has the responsibility of hiring 
and firing the top management team and overseeing the strategic direction of the firm. 
Boards are also the legal representatives of the owners of the corporation, although the 
legal responsibility of directors to shareholders can vary by country (Huse & Rindova, 
2001). 
Some argue that the board of directors has not done a good job in their role as 
monitor and failed to remove underperforming executives (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; 
Mace, 1986; Weisbach, 1988). In addition, Jensen and Smith (1985) argue that managers 
are more likely to minimize risk, engage in short-term investments and employee growth 
strategies to increase their compensation as well as their job security. Thus, the lack of 
internal control mechanisms may lead to the rise of non-traditional external control 
mechanisms like shareholder activism. As such, shareholder activism can serve as a 
"substitute" governance mechanism for internal controls. 
If the board of directors can't monitor the top management team effectively, 
shareholders will be dissatisfied with both management (and perhaps the board as well). 
Shareholders have three options: (1) sell their shares, (2) continue to hold their shares and 
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attempt to influence the firm, or (3) passively continue to hold their shares in the hope 
that things will improve over time. Clearly, option two is the path chosen by shareholder 
activists in economies where capital markets are relatively liquid. However, activism is 
not costless and only shareholders with the knowledge and resources can attempt to 
"voice" their displeasure with underperforming corporations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Admati et al., 1994). 
While agency theory is the theoretical basis almost all of the previous research on 
shareholder activism, its explanatory power is increasingly being challenged. Firms may 
be faced with not only principal-agent problems but also principal-principal problems. 
Principal-Principal Perspective 
Jiang and Peng (2010: 2) define principal-principal problems as "conflicts 
between two groups of principals: controlling shareholders and minority shareholders." 
Su, Xu and Phan, (2008: 17-18) expand this definition by stating that principal-principal 
problems refer to "the appropriation of value from minority shareholders by majority 
shareholders, often by influencing board level decisions such as asset sales and 
purchases." Nonetheless, principal-principal problems have been primarily studied in the 
context of emerging economies (Dharwadkar, George & Brandes, 2000; Su, Xu & Phan, 
2008; Jiang & Peng, 2010; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Chen & Young, 2010; Peng & 
Jiang, 2010). 
Furthermore, Su et al. (2008:21) note the following: 
Principals cannot be treated as a single entity with common interests. 
Owners diverge in their preferences for risk and returns, their private costs 
of monitoring and their strategic motivations for investing in a company. 
Moreover, owners who are in a better position to exert direct pressure in 
the boardroom, such as state representatives with political authority, 
institutional investors with large holdings and employees with the threat of 
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industrial action, can enhance their parochial interests at the expense of a 
subgroup of owners who do not have similar levels of influence. 
As shareholder activism is a mechanism for shareholders to put pressure on firm 
management, it empowers shareholders to push for changes within the firm. 
Furthermore, with the growth of institutional investors in developed countries like the US 
and UK, it is important to rethink the assumption that principal-principal problems only 
occur in emerging markets. 
Research using the principal-principal perspective is still in its infancy, with 
researchers such as Young et al. (2008) issuing a call for additional studies on principal-
principal conflicts. Evidence suggests that the growth of the hedge fund industry has 
created a group of investors who aggressively seek out firms that have resources to 
extract. Prior research has found that hedge funds target cash-rich (Klein & Zur, 2006; 
Bratton, 2007; Brav et al., 2009) high-performing firms (Klein & Zur, 2006; Brav et al., 
2009) with the short term goal of higher dividend payouts, gains through asset sales and 
short term increases in stock price. 
Thus, this paper develops a competing hypothesis in order to determine whether 
the motive of shareholder activism to curb agency problems within the firm through 
increased monitoring, or whether the motive of shareholder activism is resource 
extraction by dominant shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, 
under the principal-agent perspective, the objective of shareholder activism would be to 
take care of problems that exist within the target firm. In contrast, under the principal-
principal perspective, the objective of shareholder activism would be to benefit from 
problems that exist within the firm. In summary, the competing hypotheses perspective 
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asks whether financially driven shareholder activists are acting as "police" or as "looters" 
of the firm. 
Model of Shareholder Activism 
Based on the prior literature and original research questions, a model of 
antecedents and effects of shareholder activism is introduced. As seen in Figure 1, there 
are four main components to the model: presence of financially driven shareholder 
activism in the company, antecedents or predictors of FDSA, performance outcomes of 
FDSA and the impact of a moderator to influence the FDSA-performance relationship. 
Two competing theories are tested: principal-agent and principal-principal. 
FIGURE 1 - RESEARCH MODEL 
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Previous research on shareholder activism is extended with the inclusion of new 
antecedents, moderators, and improvements to the methodology, which will be discussed 
in Chapter III. 
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In the earlier literature review, the mixed findings of many studies may have been 
clouded because the researchers did not differentiate from the two main types of 
shareholder activism: financially driven and socially driven. This is especially true in 
studies examining proxy resolutions. Judge et al. (2010) note that there appear to be two 
types of shareholder activism. First, there is financially driven shareholder activism, 
where the motives of activism are to improve the firm's performance. A second type of 
shareholder activism has begun to garner much attention is more socially driven 
shareholder activism that is focused on environmental concerns or employee welfare. As 
this study will attempt to capture the impact of shareholder activism on financial 
performance, it is important to focus entirely on financially driven shareholder activism 
and not include socially driven activism. 
Hypothesis Development 
Antecedents 
Examining the antecedents of activism, this study tests whether the drivers of 
FDSA are due to principal-agent or principal-principal problems within the target firm. 
Three hypotheses are developed to test each competing perspective. First turning to 
principal-agent drivers of FDSA, this study looks at whether the makeup of the board of 
directors may lead the company to be targeted by financially driven shareholder activists 
due to principal-agent problems within the firms that are the result of poor board 
monitoring. The model includes variables such as board independence, outside director 
busyness and CEO duality. Three competing principal-principal drivers of FDSA focus 
on firm characteristics that would lead a FDSA to target a firm with the objective of 
extracting resources from the firm. The model includes three variables to proxy 
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principal-principal problems: debt levels, blockholder ownership and pressure resistance 
of the dominant owner. Drawing on the literature and considering insights from 
principal-agent and principal-principal perspectives, this study will determine which 
competing perspective does a better job in explaining the presence of FDSA. 
Principal-Agent Drivers of FDSA 
The board of directors plays an important role as the fulcrum between 
shareholders and managers. The board of directors for a firm was first created when 
firms began to grow in size and incorporate. With the incorporation of companies, firms 
grew too big to be owned and managed by a single person (Berle & Means, 1932). This 
led to the advent of the modern corporation with owners becoming principles of the firm 
and contracting agents or executives to manage the day-to-day operations of the firm. 
From an agency theory perspective, one key role of a board is to act on the behalf of 
owners to monitor the firm's managers. Shareholder activism is a mechanism to express 
dissatisfaction with the firm or the board of directors. In this section, it is argued that 
board of director characteristics may be signals to shareholders that the firm's governance 
practices may be lacking. Furthermore, board issues may lead a firm to be less equipped 
to handle the complex problems that a firm faces. Using agency theory logic, it is argued 
that board independence, outside director busyness and CEO duality, are important 
factors that could be leading to increased levels of shareholder activism. 
Board Independence. Agency theory suggests that board independence is an 
important factor that will lead to more effective monitoring of management and is 
included in the study as a predictor of FDSA. Board members can be comprised of 
insiders, who are currently employed or have been employed by the company, and 
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outsiders, who have no ties to the firm or its executives. Board independence refers to 
the ratio of outsiders to insiders; the more outsiders that make up the board, the more 
independent the board. 
Relatively little is known about how board independence may trigger shareholder 
activism. However, agency theory predicts that inadequate board monitoring will invite 
managerial opportunism (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and this could lead to 
shareholder activism. The literature on board composition is vast and empirical results 
from the studies are largely equivocal. However, some studies find that a high number of 
outsiders on the board can be detrimental to the firm. Westphal and Bednar (2005) find 
that outside directors having low friendship ties and differences in functional 
backgrounds lead to pluralistic ignorance and create strategic persistence in the firm. 
Mace (1986) finds that the cognitive diversity of outside board members can negatively 
impact a board member's commitment to the board. Others find that high levels of 
outsiders increase group conflict (Kor, 2006; Milliken & Martins, 1996). Zahra (1996) 
found empirical support that outside directors can negatively impact a firm's 
entrepreneurship activities. 
A core agency theory argument is that boards are set up to monitor company 
executives and protect shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus, Fama (1980) 
argues that it is crucial to have outside directors to monitor managers. A number of 
studies have shown that boards with a majority of outside directors are more effective in 
overseeing management (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Byrd & 
Hickman, 1992; Morck & Nakamura, 1994; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Bhagat & Black, 
2002). Outside directors have been found to have different motivations than inside 
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directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that outside directors have their personal 
reputations at stake, which is an added incentive to be effective board directors. 
Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) found that a vigilant board which consisted of a majority 
of outside directors is positively related to firm performance. Numerous studies have 
found that outsiders are more likely to have CEOs fired for poor financial performance 
(Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Warner, Watts & Wruck, 1988). 
Furthermore, codes of governance have suggested that boards should have 
independent directors. In the UK, the Cadbury Report of 1992 recommended that firms 
should have a balanced board with at a least three independent, non-executive directors. 
In 2008, the British code stated that at least 50% of the board, excluding the chair, should 
have independent non-executive directors. 
Using agency theory logic, outside directors will be more vigilant and not have 
the same conflict of interest issues that inside board members may have. If shareholders 
feel that a firm's board is acting in the best interest of the firm, they will be less likely to 
target a firm for shareholder activism. Thus, it is hypothesized that boards with a larger 
percentage of outside directors will face less shareholder activism due to the limited 
opportunity for managerial opportunism. 
Hypothesis 1: The board of director's level of independence of the target 
firm will be negatively associated with FDSA. 
Outside Director Busyness. The second principal-agent predictor of FDSA is 
outside director busyness, which refers to board directors who hold multiple board seats 
in various firms (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003). There are two schools of 
thought about multiple directorships. First, from a resource dependency perspective, 
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directors who belong to multiple boards have extensive outside contacts and can work to 
solidify relationships with customers or suppliers (Ghosh, 2007). The argument is that 
the better the director, the more popular they will be, and the more invitations they will 
receive to join multiple boards. Mace (1986) argues that outside directors can provide 
the firm with prestige, contacts, and enhanced visibility. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) 
find that board members with multiple directorships add value by providing a significant 
amount of expertise. There is some empirical evidence to support the resource 
dependency perspective linking multiple board appointments with firm performance 
(Brown & Maloney, 1999; Ferris, et al., 2003; Harris & Shimizu, 2004; Miwa & 
Ramseyer, 2000). 
On the other hand, agency theorists suggest that multiple board appointments can 
adversely affect the board's monitoring capabilities as directors become overcommitted. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that decision quality suffers due to the lack of time to 
devote to board duties. Furthermore, two groups, the National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) and the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), have recommended 
placing limits on a number of board appointments an individual should accept. NACD 
suggests that individuals holding senior corporate executive positions should accept no 
more than three board appointments while the CII recommends that individuals holding 
full-time jobs be limited to no more than two board appointments. There is some 
empirical evidence to support the agency perspective. Core, Holthausen and Larcker 
(1999) find a positive relationship between director busyness and excessive CEO 
compensation. Others find a negative relationship between the number of outside board 
seats and firm performance. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that busy 
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boards have a 4.2% lower book to market ratio, lower operating ROA, lower asset 
turnover ratios, and lower operating return on sales. They also point out methodological 
problems with the Ferris et al. (2003) study which finds a positive relationship between 
busy boards and firm performance. Jackling and Johl (2009) also find a negative 
relationship between multiple directorships and firm performance in a sample of Indian 
firms. Finally, Jiraporn, Singh and Lee (2009) find that firms with multiple directorships 
tend to be more diversified and are more likely to suffer from diversification discount 
issues (Denis, Denis & Yost, 2002). 
As shareholder activism may be driven by agency problems within the firm, and a 
firm with a busy board signifies that boards may not be in the best position to monitor the 
firm, outside director busyness may be a key antecedent of financially driven shareholder 
activism. Thus, the next hypothesis is offered. 
Hypothesis 2: The level of outside director busyness of the target firm is 
positively associated with FDSA. 
CEO duality. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that agents, or executives of 
the firm, are self-serving, driven to maximize their own utility and will do so at the 
expense of performance of the company. Thus, the board of directors plays an important 
role as the watchdog for the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). One major debate has 
centered around whether a firm benefits by having the same person hold dual roles of 
both the chairperson and chief executive officer (CEO). The chairperson heads the group 
of board of directors. Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994:1087) suggest that having the same 
person occupy both positions "conveys a sense of unity of command and strong 
leadership to stakeholders." On the other hand, there may be a conflict of interest when 
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the Chairperson is also the CEO (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Fizel & Louie, 1990; 
Daynton, 1984). Furthermore, Westphal and Zajac (1995) suggest that a CEO who is 
also the Chairperson of the board may be more likely to select board members who will 
not challenge him/her. 
There is little empirical evidence to predict how the existence of CEO duality will 
impact the level of shareholder activism. Principal-agent problems may be exacerbated 
due to the increased power of the CEO who also has the chairperson role. Occupying 
both CEO and Chair roles would make a person more likely to misuse his or her power 
and make decisions that benefit him/herself. Thus, using the principal-agent perspective, 
it is argued that firms with CEO duality would be more likely to be targeted by 
financially driven shareholder activists. This leads to the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The existence of CEO duality in a target firm will be positively 
associated with FDSA. 
Principal-principal problems as drivers of FDSA. 
In this section, three hypotheses are introduced to test whether principal-principal 
problems may be driving FDSA. Under this perspective, FDSA is a mechanism to 
benefit from problems in the target firm. While the principal-principal perspective has 
previously been tested within emerging markets, this study examines whether the 
motivation of FDSA is resource extraction. There is anecdotal evidence that some 
shareholder activists such as hedge funds act like wolves in sheep's clothing (Kupla, 
2005). The first hypothesis looks at the firm's debt levels and how debt levels create 
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increased potential for expropriation. The next two hypotheses examine how the 
ownership structure of the firm creates opportunities for FDSAs to expropriate resources. 
Debt level. According to classic agency theory, debt acts as a mechanism to alleviate 
agency problems (Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
firm managers would rather use debt instead of equity as a strategy to avoid monitoring. 
Using the principal-agent perspective, it can be argued that high debt levels in a firm 
reduce free cash flow available to managers, which in turn reduces managerial discretion 
(Jensen, 1986). High levels of debt act as an additional monitoring mechanism, thus 
negating the need for shareholder activism. Thus, the principal-agent perspective would 
suggest a positive relationship between debt and FDS A. 
However, using principal-principal logic, the opposite relationship is argued. 
Young et al. (2008) suggest that principal-principal conflicts are the result of institutional 
environments that pit dominant owners against minority owners. From a principal-
principal perspective, higher debt levels reduce the potential for expropriation, as cash 
flow is committed to covering existing debt payments (Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001). 
Within this perspective, shareholder activists are expected to target firms that have high 
potential for resource extraction. Therefore, firms with low debt levels would be 
attractive to shareholder activists because they can demand that firms increase their debt 
to asset loads, thus increasing the potential for increased payouts to shareholders. Thus, 
according to the principal-principal perspective, FDSAs would target firms with low debt 
as they have extractable resources that can be exploited to benefit their own position. 
This leads to the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The debt level of the target firm is negatively associated with FDSA. 
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Stockholder ownership. Ownership by large shareholders, or blockholders, has 
been examined in the literature with mixed results. In addition, blockholder ownership 
has been a focus in corporate governance, but it has not been extensively investigated in 
the shareholder activism literature. The traditional agency-principal perspective would 
suggest that dominant shareholders can play an active role as monitors of the firm. It is 
known that as owners increase their stakes in a firm, the incentive to monitor increases 
(Shleifer&Vishny, 1986). 
However, Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) point out in their meta-
analysis that the empirical evidence supporting agency theory is inconclusive with 
respect to earnings management. Instead, they suggest that the existence of blockholder 
ownership can lead to additional problems within the firm. Clifford (2003) points out 
that blockholder owners can also engage in resource consumption. Morck, Wolfenzon 
and Yeung (2005) argue that concentrated ownership can cause additional problems if 
there is a misalignment of interests between the dominant shareholders and the minority 
shareholders. 
Furthermore, previous research suggests that blockholders are able to institute 
changes within the firm. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (forthcoming) show that existing 
blockholders have been able to influence investment, financial and executive 
policymaking in their firms. Denis and Serrano (1996) find that blockholders are able to 
remove top managers after failed takeover attempts. 
While prior research has examined the role of blockholder ownership and 
corporate governance, little research has been done on the impact of blockholder 
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ownership on the incidence of FDSA. Jiang and Peng (2010:4) suggest that "having 
multiple blockholders, rather than having just a single controlling shareholder, may be a 
useful internal mechanism to solve potentially devastating principal-principal problems." 
Furthermore, Bethel et al. (1998) refer to blockholder investments as the market for 
partial corporate control. If a firm is already under a "partial corporate control" by 
existing blockholders, FDSAs would see no potential in additional activism efforts. 
Under the principal-principal perspective, FDSAs target firms in the hopes of 
being able to push for changes within the firm that will benefit their own stakes at the 
expense of minority shareholders. If there already are a significant number of 
blockholders in the firm, it sends a signal that this company is already being impacted by 
dominant shareholders. Indeed, there is some preliminary empirical evidence to support 
the view of blockholder ownership preventing FDSA. Judge et al. (2010) find empirical 
support that a target firm's ownership concentration is negatively related with financially 
driven shareholder activism. Thus, using a principal-principal perspective, the level of 
blockholder ownership will have a negative relationship with FDSA. More formally 
stated: 
Hypothesis 5: The degree of blockholder ownership for the target firm is negatively 
related to FDSA. 
Pressure resistance of the dominant owner. Round (1976) argues that 
ownership structure can be described by both ownership concentration and type of 
ownership. Brickley et al. (1988) and others find that not all institutional investors are 
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alike. Indeed, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) argue that ownership concentration may not 
matter as much as the type of owner or the level of control that top owners have. 
Researchers have used three typologies to classify owners within a firm. First, 
some have used insider control versus outsider control (Cubbin & Leech, 1983) where 
banks and holding companies make up insider controlled owners and institutional 
investors with broad holdings such as pension funds comprise outsider control. Second, 
Gerlach (1992) introduced a typology that included three owner groups: insiders, stable 
investors and market investors. Insiders have a substantial equity stake but also hold a 
managerial role within the company. Stable investors are those that maintain other ties to 
the firm (such as banks, suppliers or alliance partner) and whose investment objective of 
profit maximization takes a secondary role behind maintaining the multi-faceted 
relationship. Market investors are those investors whose goal is to maximize shareholder 
return. 
Brickley et al. (1988) introduce a third typology consisting of pressure sensitive, 
pressure insensitive and pressure indeterminate owners. First, pressure sensitive 
investors are ones who may be influenced by the target firm's managers and may be less 
likely to influence the firm's actions. For example, many insurance companies, banks 
and mutual funds also have these firms as their own clients and may be reluctant to push 
for change for fear that it may harm their client relationship. In addition, when the top 
owner is an insider, they would also be fall under the pressure sensitive category. Second, 
pressure resistant institutional investors are those who do not have conflict of interest 
with their target firms and thus could be more likely to be active monitors of a firm. 
Hedge funds are a good example of a pressure resistant institutional investor. The third 
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category is pressure indeterminate investors and it is not clear whether they have the 
inclination to engage in monitoring their firms. 
Empirical work using the Brickley et al. (1998) typology have found that 
evidence that institutional owners are distinctly different in how they monitor their 
investments. In their study of anti-takeover amendments, Brickley et al. (1988) find that 
pressure sensitive institutional investors were more likely to vote with management, 
while pressure resistant investors were more likely to vote against management. Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) show that firms with pressure resistant owners have lower executive 
compensation packages than firms with pressure sensitive owners. Furthermore, Denis 
and Denis (1995) find that top management turnover after declines in performance is 
more likely to occur when pushed by pressure resistant blockholders. Finally, David, 
Kochhar and Levitas (1998) find empirical support that pressure resistant owners are 
more likely to impact CEO compensation. Conversely, if a FDSA targets a firm that has 
a pressure sensitive dominant owner, it may be assumed that the dominant owner may be 
entrenched with top management (Brickley et al., 1988). 
Using principal-principal logic, there is less opportunity for expropriation if the 
dominant owner is pressure sensitive. From a principal-principal perspective, FDSAs 
would rather target a firm that has a pressure resistant top owner as the top owner is not 
entrenched with management. Thus, it will be more likely that demands from FDSAs 
will be considered and met. Conversely, if the firm's dominant owner is pressure 
sensitive, its conflict of interest will prevent it from pushing management for changes. 
Thus, it is hypothesized that FDSAs will target firms with a dominant pressure resistant 
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top owner because it will be easier to push for change within the firm. More formally 
stated: 
Hypothesis 6: The presence of a pressure resistant dominant owner in a target firm 
is positively associated with FDSA. 
Effects of Financially Driven Shareholder Activism 
The second research question of this study focuses on the long-term effects of 
financially driven shareholder activism. The research model examines the effect of 
shareholder activism on long-term changes in firm performance. With such mixed results 
on studies examining the impact of shareholder activism on firm performance, it is 
appropriate to introduce competing hypotheses using both principal-agent and principal-
principal perspectives. 
Principal-agent perspective and changes in firm performance 
There is evidence of a positive relationship between shareholder activism and 
firm performance. Nesbitt (1994) found positive increases in market-based performance 
of 41% in his study of shareholder activism by the CalPERs pension fund. Anson et al. 
(2003; 2004) show both short and long term market based returns after CalPERS released 
their list of targeted firms. Barber (2006) finds that CalPERS is able to generate both 
short-term market-based gains and long-term market-based gains over 5 years for firms 
placed on their target list. 
Strickland et al. (1996) show positive CARs after activism by the US Shareholder 
Association. Opler and Sokobin (1998) show that the Council on Institutional Investors 
generated market-based returns of 11.6% after they made their target list of firms public. 
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Boyson and Mooradian (2007) find both short-term market-based gains as well as 
long term accounting-based performance increases as a result of hedge fund activism. 
Bratton (2007) also finds short term market-based gains as a result of activism efforts by 
hedge funds. Brav et al. (2009) and Clifford (2008) find both short term market-based 
gains and long-term accounting based increases in performance as a result of hedge fund 
activism. 
Monks and Minow (1996) suggest that shareholder activism can be a powerful 
force for corporate governance. Shareholders who perceive that firms are being 
mismanaged can use shareholder activism tactics to voice their displeasure and try to 
institute change within the firm. It can be argued that shareholder activism is another 
monitoring device to address agency problems within the firm. From an agency theory 
perspective, the presence of shareholder activism should increase the level of monitoring 
of the firm. Increased monitoring should curb agency problems and lead to increased 
firm performance. Following previous empirical evidence and principal-agency logic, 
there should be a positive relationship between FDSA and subsequent firm performance. 
More formally stated: 
Hypothesis 7a: FDSA is positively associated with subsequent changes in 
long-term financial performance of the target firm. 
Principal-principal perspective and changes in firm performance 
On the other hand, there's a body of research that suggests that shareholder 
activism has either no impact or a negative impact on target firms. A number of studies 
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find no changes in firm performance after shareholder activism (Karpoff et al., 1996; 
Wahal, 1996; Black, 1998; Romano, 2001). Klein and Zur (2006) report declines in EPS, 
ROA and ROE one year after the 13D filings by hedge fund activists. Prevost and Rao 
(2000) show negative returns after proxy mailings in their sample of pension fund 
activism. 
According to the principal-principal perspective, FDSA is a mechanism for 
shareholder activists to profit from their investments to the longer term detriment of the 
target firm. Other studies have found that firms targeted by shareholder activists 
experienced increased sales of assets (Bethel et al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; 
Greenwood & Schor, 2007), increased employee layoffs (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999) 
and increased cash payouts (Bratton, 2007). Bethel et al. (1998) suggest that shareholder 
activists may have different sets of objectives when targeting firms. There is some 
evidence that not all activists are alike and that some activists are more aggressive in their 
quest for short-term gains. Specifically, hedge funds and blockholder activists have been 
known for being more aggressive activists than pension funds and individual investors. 
Just as owners have divergent interests and objectives (Su et al., 2008), some 
activists could also have the goal of expropriation, defined as "the disproportional sharing 
of gains (or losses) among different shareholders" (Faccio & Stolin, 2006:1416). 
Shareholder activists like hedge funds and blockholders are increasing pressure to deliver 
short-term results via asset sales and increased cash payouts, while other investors are 
more interested in long term results. Some activist hedge funds have been described as 
the "newest version of Wall Street wolves, always poised to attack new companies while 
claiming to be acting in shareholder's best interests by operating under a cloak of 
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shareholder clothing" (Kulpa, 2005: 78). Furthermore, Kulpa (2005) contends that hedge 
funds use sophisticated gaming models to take advantage of shareholder voting as well as 
engaging in "wolf pack" maneuvers where these unregulated financial instruments band 
together to confront management. Kahan and Rock (2007) argue that hedge funds' quest 
for short-term profits may lead to longer-term problems for their shareholder activism 
targets. 
Based on the idea that not all owners have the same investment objectives and 
some shareholder activists may be extremely powerful shareholders with the potential for 
expropriation, the principal-principal perspective would suggest that FDSA leads to 
negative changes in firm performance. This leads to the corollary of Hypothesis 7a: 
Hypothesis 7b: FDSA is negatively associated with subsequent changes in long-term 
financial performance for the target firm. 
The Moderating Role of Governance Environment 
Given the mixed empirical results of the impact of shareholder activism on firm 
performance, there is a need to examine whether there could be moderators influencing 
the relationship between FDSA and long-term firm performance. Thus, two competing 
hypotheses are developed using logic from the principal-agent and principal-principal 
perspectives. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003) suggest that 
governance environments differ between countries. Even though the US and the UK 
have Anglo-American governance systems, their respective regulatory environments 
have evolved in unique ways. Overall, US shareholders do not have the same level of 
rights that UK shareholders do. The UK started its reform governance reform efforts in 
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1992 with the Cadbury Report, which advocated the separation of the chair and CEO 
positions as well as stipulating that there should be three or more independent non-
executive directors. On the other hand, the US did not institute governance reform until 
10 years later in 2002 with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
UK shareholders have significant powers that US shareholders do not. First, 
shareholders in the UK are able to call special meetings with as little as 10% of the vote. 
Second, UK shareholders can replace board members at any time if they get a majority 
vote. Third, in the UK, proxy resolutions are binding. In contrast, US shareholders have 
one opportunity every year to introduce a shareholder resolution during the annual 
shareholders meeting. Furthermore, it is difficult and expensive to introduce a proxy 
resolution. US shareholders do not have the power to replace board members as the 
proxy votes are nonbinding. Thus, even if the majority of shareholders vote to remove a 
director, the company does not need to act on it. Similarly, board members can be re-
elected without a majority vote. 
The UK has been refining its governance mechanisms with numerous non-binding 
recommendations via the Greenbury Report (1995) which focused on executive 
compensation, the Hampel Report (1998) which combined the Greenbury and Cadbury 
reports, the Turnbull Report (1999) which focused on internal controls and risk, and the 
Higgs Review (2003), which redefined board independence. All of these are non-binding 
resolutions that have been voluntarily adopted by a large number of companies in the 
UK. Although these resolutions are nonbinding, UK companies must report whether they 
are in compliance with the code. 
65 
Principal-Agent Prediction 
Using the principal-agent perspective, shareholder activism is a tool to increase 
the level of monitoring in a firm. Increased monitoring should lead to positive changes in 
firm performance. Aguilera et al. (2006) argue that UK shareholder activism is much 
different than US shareholder activism. First, as shareholders in the UK have established 
methods to voice dissatisfaction with firm management, they will be less inclined to 
resort to public shareholder activism. Holland (1988) reports that institutional investors 
have easy access to firm managers and directors and are able to meet with them regularly. 
Second, the UK has more effective alternative governance mechanisms such as 
Extraordinary General Meetings and binding shareholder resolutions, so that shareholders 
of UK firms have other ways to express their dissatisfaction with firm management. 
First, much shareholder activism in the UK is behind the scenes and out of the public eye 
(Black and Coffee, 1994; Holland, 1998) and beyond the scope of this study. Last, with 
so many governance mechanisms available to shareholders, shareholder activism in the 
UK may be a "tool of last resort" only utilized when all other mechanisms fail. In the 
UK, it is hypothesized that shareholder activism in the UK is not expected to be as 
effective as activism in the US as it is directed at the worst offenders. 
On the other hand, US shareholders do not have the same mechanisms to express 
their dissatisfaction and use shareholder activism as their primary monitoring tool. 
Shareholder activism is expected to be more effective in the US for several reasons. One, 
shareholder activism is one of the few tools that shareholders have to express 
dissatisfaction with firm management. Two, there is a long history of shareholder 
activism in the US (Marens, 2002), and many activists like CalPERS and the Council of 
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Institutional Investors (CII) effectively use the press to publicly chastise firms on their 
target list (Wahal, 1996; Crutchley et al., 1998; Opler & Sokobin, 1998; Caton et al., 
2001; Song & Szewczyk, 2003; and others). 
This follows that the effects of FDSA on firm performance will be moderated by 
governance environment. Using principal-agent logic, it is hypothesized that greater 
reliance in shareholder activism as a primary monitoring tool in the US will lead to 
greater positive changes in financial performance than in the UK. Thus: 
Hypothesis 8a: The governance environment will moderate the FDSA -firm 
performance relationship. Specifically, the FDSA- firm performance relationship 
will be stronger and more positive in the US than in the UK governance 
environment due to moral hazard mitigation. 
Principal-Principal Prediction 
Using the principal-principal perspective, shareholder activism is a means to 
expropriate resources from the company at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, 
firms operating in a governance environment with weaker protection of minority 
shareholders should experience a more negative impact on firm performance as a result 
of FDSA. There is some evidence to suggest that the UK provides more protection for 
minority shareholders. First, Lele and Siems (2006) track shareholder protection in five 
countries including the US and UK over 35 years. They find that UK had a higher level 
of shareholder protection based on a 60 variable shareholder protection index. Second, 
UK laws and governance codes empower smaller shareholders through EGMs and 
increased disclosure requirements. Third, La Porta et al. (1997) state that the UK is a 
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country that provides minority shareholders with strong rights. Fourth, Aguilera 
(2005:42) goes even further by stating that the "UK is a pioneer and trend-setter in codes 
of good governance." If the UK is known for having the best corporate governance, it 
follows that governance codes will protect the smaller shareholder. If smaller 
shareholders are being protected, it will be more difficult for larger shareholders to 
engage in expropriation in the UK. 
On the other hand, US shareholder laws discriminate against small investors, 
creating an environment that is more conducive to expropriation by larger shareholders. 
Compared to the UK, it is relatively expensive to engage in shareholder activism and 
only larger organizations can do it, but only if they see the potential for a substantial 
return (Admati et al., 1994). For example, Bob Monks spent over $1 million from his 
personal wealth to engage in shareholder activism efforts against Sears (Monks & 
Minow, 1996). 
Using principal-principal logic, if FDSA is a mechanism to extract resources at 
the expense of smaller shareholders, the expected FDSA-firm performance relationship 
will be negative. However., in the UK, firm performance will be less negatively affected 
than in the US due to its strong governance codes and protection of minority 
shareholders. Conversely, in the US, firm performance will be more negatively affected 
than in the UK due to its US governance practices that favor the large investor. More 
formally stated: 
Hypothesis 8b: The governance environment will moderate the FDSA- firm 
performance relationship. Specifically, the FDSA-firm performance relationship 
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will be stronger and more negative in the US than in the UK governance 
environments due to expropriation problems. 
Summary 
In summary, a model of the antecedents and effects of shareholder activism was 
developed. The model tests three principal-agency drivers and three principal-principal 
drivers of shareholder activism. The model also examines the impact of FDSA on firm 
performance and includes a moderator capturing the impact of governance environment 
on the relationship between FDSA and changes in firm performance. Both principal-
agency and principal-principal perspectives were used to develop eight research 
hypotheses. Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses along with theoretical foundations, and 
predicted relationships. In the next chapter, the methodology will be introduced with a 
description of the research design, sample, operationalization of variables and the plan for 
data analysis. 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS 
H# THEORY 
ANTECEDENTS 
HI P-A 
H2 P-A 
H3 P-A 
H4 P-P 
H5 P-P 
H6 P-P 
EFFECTS 
H7a P-A 
H7b P-P 
MODERATORS 
H8a P-A 
H8b P-P 
PREDICTED 
VARIABLE RELATIONSHIP 
Independence Negative 
Outside Director Busyness Positive 
CEO Duality Positive 
Debt level Negative 
Blockholder ownership Negative 
Pressure Resistance of Dominant Owner Positive 
FDSA Positive 
FDSA Negative 
Governance Environment Stronger positive relationship in US 
Governance Environment Stronger negative relationship in US 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to attain a better understanding of the antecedents and effects 
of shareholder activism in the US and the UK via a longitudinal study. In this chapter, 
the methodology used to carry out empirical testing of the research model described in 
the previous chapter is described. The methodologies of previous studies in shareholder 
activism are examined and discussed. Next, the research design is introduced with 
descriptions of the sample, operationalization of all variables, and the statistical analyses 
used to test the hypotheses that were introduced in the previous chapter. 
Research design 
In developing the research design for this study, a thorough examination of past 
research was conducted. Kahan and Rock (2006) and others report that much shareholder 
activism is behind closed doors and thus extremely difficult to measure. This study will 
be limited to formal activism events while ignoring informal behind the scenes 
discussions and dialogue. 
Identifying shareholder activism is difficult and each method has weaknesses. 
Researchers have used five major methods to identify incidences of shareholder activism 
and study its effects. First, a large number of researchers studying US-based companies 
have tracked proxy resolutions filed by different types of shareholder activists (Karpoff et 
al., 1996; Wahal, 1996; Carleton et al., 1998; Johnson & Sheckell, 1997; Del Guercio & 
Hawkins, 1999; Campbell, Gillan & Niden, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Schwab & 
Thomas, 1998; Thomas & Martin, 1998; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Choi, 2000; Thomas et 
al., 2005; Akyol & Carroll, 2006; Prevost et al., 2009). The primary weaknesses are that 
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proxy resolutions are non-binding and are just one mechanism of shareholder activism 
utilized by activists. Second, other researchers studying activism in US firms have 
identified shareholder activism via the SEC schedule 13D, which is required when 
companies purchase a 5% or greater stake in the company (Boyson & Mooradian, 2007; 
Bratton, 2007; Greenwood & Schor, 2007; Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008). A 
limitation of this method is that shareholder activists who don't make block purchases are 
excluded from analysis. In addition, reliance on the schedule 13D form limits researchers 
from expanding to multiple country samples. 
Third, others have worked with a specific activist and gained access to internal 
records. Becht et al. (2009) were able to follow the internal workings of the Hermes UK 
Focus Fund and its activism strategies and effects, yet the study lacks generalizability due 
to the small sample size. Fourth, others have done case studies. Hernandez-Lopez 
(2003) did a case study of two firms' attempts to take over other firms in Europe. Kruse 
(2007) examined the case of one firm (Olivetti) attempting to take over another (Telecom 
Italia) in Italy. In addition, Anderson et al. (2007) examined shareholder activism in 
Australia with a case study of four Australian unions. As with any case study, one runs 
into problems of generalizability. 
Finally, a few researchers have used content analysis of news stories to build a 
database of shareholder activists and have tracked their activism efforts. Crutchley et al. 
(1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and English et al. (2004) use the Wall Street 
Journal to identify public announcements of the CalPERS pension fund releasing their 
target list. Croci (2007) used national newspapers in Europe to identify a sample of 
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corporate raiders and their targets for shareholder activism. Judge et al. (2010) use 
Factiva to identify incidences of shareholder activism. 
A challenge in any multi-country study is the availability of similar data for all the 
countries in the study. Following Crutchley et al. (1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins 
(1999), English et al. (2004) and Croci (2007), a sample of shareholder activists is 
created from the examination of news stories. As there is no database that covers 
shareholder activism in both the US and UK covering a long period of time, content 
analysis using the Dow Jones Factiva database is used to uncover shareholder activism 
events. Factiva provides comprehensive archival database of news reports from more 
than 25,000 publications worldwide. Using the content analysis framework provided by 
Neuendorf (2002), a codebook is created along with a coding form that two independent 
coders used. The codebook can be found in Appendix A. 
A search for the keyword term "shareholder activism" for each company was 
conducted for the years 2000 through 2007. Two coders were used to code articles 
containing shareholder activism and company name for the 187 firms in the sample. One 
coder was the author and the other coder was a paid graduate student. Both coders noted 
the date of the activism event, method of activism, goal of the activism, initiator of the 
activism, and the outcome of the activism. The author was experienced in content 
analysis. The graduate student was trained by first doing content analysis on five 
companies to make sure he understood how to code an article. The graduate student was 
also requested to cut and paste all the relevant details from the article into an Excel 
spreadsheet for future reference. To check for inter-coder reliability, both coders 
evaluated the same 60 companies. Results were compared and an inter-coder reliability 
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of 92% was found, giving the study adequate inter-coder reliability. In addition, 
following Judge et al. (2010), the activism event was later coded into two categories: 
financially driven and non-financially driven activism. The literature divides activism by 
two general goals: improvement of corporate social responsibility and improvement of 
company performance. All activism events that are unrelated to corporate social 
responsibility are labeled as financially driven shareholder activism. 
Establishing the validity of the FDSA measure is difficult, as there are many 
methods that shareholder activists used, including proxy resolutions, issuing public 
reports or naming to focus lists, letters/meetings or dialogue with management, buying a 
stake in the company, shareholder lawsuits, proxy fights and letters to SEC. In the 
sample, the most common method used by FDSA was proxy resolutions. In order to test 
the validity of the FDSA measure, a sample of 40 firm years was selected with 20 firm 
years drawn from companies who were targeted by FDSA using proxy resolutions. 
Another sample of 20 firm years was randomly drawn from the group of firm years that 
was not targeted by any FDSA efforts. Proxy resolution data was only available on US 
companies. Using the SEC database of schedule 14A filings, the incidence of FDSA 
using proxy resolutions as the mechanism for shareholder activism was coded for the 40 
firm years. Each shareholder resolution was examined and coded as 0/1 dummy variable 
(with 1 having an FDSA related resolution) and also as a continuous count variable. Two 
correlation analyses were conducted using the dummy and continuous variables. 
Correlations were .629 and .611 for the dummy and continuous variables, respectively, 
and those results are significant (p<.01). Thus, using content analysis to capture 
incidence of FDSA is a valid measure. 
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Sample 
The other key decision besides creating a mechanism to identify shareholder 
activism events is to create a sample of companies not targeted by shareholder activists in 
which to make statistical comparisons. While many studies use primarily descriptive 
statistics (see Kahan & Rock, 2006; Bratton, 2007; Greenwood & Schor, 2007; Lewis & 
Mackenzie, 2000), most of the studies relied on creating a matched pair sample in which 
to make comparisons. Unfortunately, there is no uniformity in creating matched samples 
in previous shareholder activism studies. Most use industry classifications as defined by 
SIC code and some other measure. Some researchers used industry defined by 2-digit 
SICs and selected a matched sample based on the company nearest in market 
capitalization as measured by the book value of assets (Karpoff et al., 1996; Carleton et 
al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Thomas et al., 2005). Smith (1996) used four-
digit SICs and the companies closest in sales revenue. According to Kerlinger and Lee 
(2000), matched pair design has two major flaws. First, it is difficult to identify the most 
pertinent match criteria. In the above studies, pairs were built matching on such criteria 
as industry and total assets, market capitalization, and sales revenue. Second, the more 
variables that a researcher tries to match, the more difficult it becomes to identify a 
matched pair. As a result, the generalizability of a matched pair study is compromised 
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). 
This study uses an alternative to the matched pairs design approach. Following 
Wu (2004), the top 100 firms in the US and the UK are selected because it is 
methodologically superior to a matched-pairs design with a sample time frame of 2000-
2007. Thus, the control firms consist of those firms not targeted by shareholder activists. 
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Following Vafeas (2003), Clifford (2008) and Certo, Dalton, Dalton and Lester (2008), 
all financial and utility firms are dropped, as these industries are highly regulated, which 
could impact governance variables. Thus, all firms in SICs between 4900 and 4999 
(utilities) and 6000-6999 (financial institutions) are dropped from the sample. The 
original sample consists of the top 100 US and UK publicly held firms as measured by 
market capitalization in March, 2009 and was drawn from Thomson One Financial. For 
13 firms, data was not available leaving a final sample of 94 US firms and 93 UK firms. 
The final panel dataset consists of a total of 187 firms with observations over eight years 
(2000-2007), creating a total of 1,444 firm year observations. 
However, due to some missing observations on some variables, some analyses 
will show slightly different total firm year observations. All financial information was 
sourced from Thomson One Financial. Information on US company board of directors 
was sourced from Risk Metrics while UK company board information was sourced from 
annual reports. Compact Disclosure was the source of ownership data on US firms and 
annual reports were used to gather ownership data on UK firms. 
Country Selection 
The two country environments of the US and the UK are selected for several 
reasons. First, the US is selected because it is the largest economy in the world, 
representing roughly 25% of world GDP (CIA World Fact Book). Shareholder activism 
originated in the US and, thus, there is a higher incidence of shareholder activism than in 
other countries. Second, the UK is selected because the governance environment in the 
UK is viewed by many to be more advanced than in the US, and shareholder activism is 
also a prevalent governance mechanism (Becht et al. (2009). 
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Becht et al. (2009) provide an excellent overview of the differences between the 
governance environments of the US and the UK. The legal environment in the UK 
provides shareholders with more rights than in the US. For example, in the UK, 
shareholders have the right to call extraordinary general meetings with only 10% of the 
shareholders requesting the meeting. In the UK, it is much easier and less expensive to 
get a proxy resolution added to the ballot. As few as 5% of the shareholders or a 
minimum of 100 shareholders can get a resolution put on the ballot at the annual 
shareholders meeting. In the US, those submitting proxy resolutions must pay the full 
cost, which can be prohibitive for most investors. 
In addition, there are differences in how boards of directors are appointed and 
removed. Board members in the US are appointed via elections but do not require a 
majority vote, whereas in the UK a majority vote is necessary. In the US, it is much 
more difficult to remove a board director member, as the decision must be unanimous. 
Conversely, in the UK, a director can be removed via a proxy resolution vote. In 
the US, board director terms are staggered, which means that only a portion of the board 
comes up for reelection at one specific time. US firms also have the ability to create 
poison pills to fend off hostile takeovers while that is not allowed in the UK. Finally, 
CEO duality is much more common in the USA than in the UK (Aguilera et al., 2006). 
In conclusion, both governance environments enable shareholder activism, but the 
governance environments in the UK rely on other governance mechanisms than does the 
USA. 
Tables 3 and 4 show the full listing of companies used in the study and includes 
information about how many years these firms were targeted by FDSA and the total 
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TABLE 3 - US FIRMS TARGETED BY FDSA 
Firm 
3M Company 
Abbott Laboratories 
Alcoa Incorporated 
Altria Group Inc 
Amazon.com Inc 
Amgen Inc 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. 
Apache Corp. 
Apple Inc 
Applied Materials Inc 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company 
AT & T Inc 
Baker Hughes Inc 
Baxter International Inc 
Best Buy Company Inc 
Bristol Myers Squibb Company 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp 
Caterpillar Inc 
Chevron Corp. 
Cisco Systems Inc 
Colgate-Palmolive Company 
Comcast Corp. 
Conocophillips 
Corning Inc 
Costco Wholesale Corp. 
CVS Caremark Corp. 
Danaher Corp. 
Deere & Company 
Dell Inc 
Devon Energy Corp. 
Dow Chemical Company 
Ebay Inc 
EI Du Pont De Nemours 
ELI Lilly & Company 
EMC Corp. 
Emerson Electric Company 
Exxon Mobil Corp. 
Fedex Corp. 
Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold 
Genentech Inc 
General Dynamics Corp. 
General Electric Company 
Gilead Sciences Inc 
Halliburton Company 
Hess Corp. 
Hewlett-Packard Company 
Home Depot Inc 
# years 
targeted 
by FDSA 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
total # of 
FDSA 
attempts 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
9 
13 
Firm 
Honeywell International Inc 
Illinois Tool Works Inc 
Intel Corp. 
International Business Machines Corp. 
Johnson & Johnson 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. 
Lockheed Martin Corp. 
Lowe's Companies Inc 
Marathon Oil Corp. 
McDonalds Corp. 
Medtronic Inc 
Merck & Company Inc 
Microsoft Corp. 
Monsanto Company 
Motorola Inc 
National Oilwell Varco Inc 
Nike Inc 
Northrop Grumman Corp. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
Pepsico Inc 
Pfizer Inc 
Praxair Inc 
Qualcomm Inc 
Raytheon Company 
Schering-Plough Corp. 
Schlumberger Limited 
Sprint Nextel Corp. 
Stryker Corp. 
Target Corp. 
Texas Instruments Inc 
The Boeing Company 
The Coca Cola Company 
The Procter & Gamble Company 
The Walt Disney Company 
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inco 
Time Warner Inc 
Transocean Limited 
Union Pacific Corp. 
United Parcel Service Inc 
United Technologies Corp. 
Valero Energy Corp. 
Verizon Communications 
Viacom Inc 
Wal Mart Stores Inc 
Walgreen Company 
Wyeth 
XTO Energy Inc 
# years 
targeted 
by FDSA 
0 
0 
0 
4 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
1 
2 
0 
3 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
total# of 
FDSA 
attempts 
0 
0 
0 
12 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
1 
9 
0 
8 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
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TABLE 4 - UK FIRMS TARGETED BY FDSA 
# years total # of # years total # of 
targeted FDSA targeted FDSA 
Firm by FDSA attempts Firm by FDSA attempts 
Amec PLC 
Antofagasta PLC 
Associated British Foods PLC 
Astrazeneca PLC 
Autonomy Corp. PLC 
BAE Systems PLC 
Balfour Beatty PLC 
Barratt Developments PLC 
Berkeley Group Holdings PLC 
BG Group PLC 
BHP Billiton PLC 
BPPLC 
British Airways PLC 
British American Tobacco PLC 
British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC 
BT Group PLC 
Bunzl PLC 
Burberry Group PLC 
Cable & Wireless PLC 
Cadbury PLC 
Cairn Energy PLC 
Carnival PLC 
Carphone Warehouse Group PLC 
Cobham PLC 
Compass Group PLC 
Daily Mail & General Trust PLC 
Diageo PLC 
DSG International PLC 
Easyjet PLC 
Enterprise Inns PLC 
Experian PLC 
First Group PLC 
G4S PLC 
GKNPLC 
Glaxosmithkline PLC 
Hays PLC 
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC 
Inchcape PLC 
Informa PLC 
Intercontinental Hotels Group PLC 
Invensys PLC 
ITVPLC 
Johnson Matthey PLC 
Kesa Electricals PLC 
Kingfisher PLC 
Ladbrokes PLC 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
4 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Logica PLC 
Lonmin PLC 
Marks & Spencer Group PLC 
Meggitt PLC 
Mitchells & Butlers PLC 
Morrison (WM) Supermarkets PLC 
National Express Group PLC 
Next PLC 
Pearson PLC 
Persimmon PLC 
Petrofac Limited 
Premier Foods PLC 
Punch Taverns PLC 
Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC 
Reed Elsevier PLC 
Rentokil Initial PLC 
Rexam PLC 
Rio Tinto PLC 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC 
Sabmiller PLC 
Sainsbury (J) PLC 
Serco Group PLC 
Shire PLC 
Sibir Energy PLC 
Smith & Nephew PLC 
Smiths Group PLC 
Stagecoach Group PLC 
Tate & Lyle PLC 
Taylor Wimpey PLC 
Tesco PLC 
The Capita Group PLC 
The Sage Group PLC 
Tullow Oil PLC 
Unilever PLC 
Vedanta Resources PLC 
Vodafone Group PLC 
Weir Group PLC 
Whitbread PLC 
William Hill PLC 
Wolseley PLC 
Wood Group (John) PLC 
WPP PLC 
Xstrata PLC 
Yell Group PLC 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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number of FDSA attempts. For example, Home Depot, Inc., a US-based home 
improvement retailer, was targeted two years of the sample time frame, but was targeted 
by thirteen separate groups of activists and/or activism objectives. A closer look at the 
data reveals that six of the activism efforts occurred in 2006 and seven in 2007. 
Measures 
Table 5 contains a listing of all variables used in the study, operational 
definitions, years of data collected, source of the data and an indication of whether the 
variable used is collected one year prior to the activism event (t-1), the year of the 
activism event (t=0), the year after the activism event (t+1) or two years after the 
activism event (t+2). 
The research model includes two broad sets of analyses. In the first set of 
analyses, a broad set of variables are used to predict the incidence of FDSA. In the 
second set of analyses, another set of variables are used to determine the impact of FDSA 
on changes in firm performance. First, measures for independent variables are introduced 
followed by the control variables and the dependent variables. All of the independent 
variables to test the first set of hypotheses related to antecedents are measured in the year 
prior to the activism event and independent variables used to test effects are measured the 
year of the activism event. All measures of firm performance subsequent to the FDSA 
event are measured for both one and two years after the activism event. 
Independent Variables: 
Proxies for Agency Theory predictors of FDSA. Three variables are used as proxies of 
principal-agency predictors of FDSA: board independence, outside director busyness, 
and CEO duality. Board independence refers to the make-up of outsiders 
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versus insiders that comprise the board of directors of a firm. Following Ferris et al. 
(2003), an outside board member is classified as a board member who is not currently 
working at the firm. Thus, board independence is calculated by the ratio of outside 
board members to the total number of board members and is collected each prior year 
from 1999-2006. Data on US firms was sourced from the Risk Metrics database while 
data on UK firms were gathered from annual reports. 
Outside director busyness refers to the number of outside board seats each 
director holds divided by the number of outside directors. In general, board of director 
busyness has been measured several different ways. First, Jiraporn et al. (2009) measures 
the total number of outside directorships held by both inside and outside directors. 
Second, Ferris et al. (2003) used four different measures for board busyness. One was 
the average number of directors' positions held by all the directors. Two, they measured 
the maximum number of director positions held. Three, they measured the percentage of 
directors that held three or more outside director positions. Four, they focus only on 
outside directors and measured the average number of outside director positions held by 
outside board members. 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) criticize the operationalization of the Ferris et al. 
(2003) study, suggesting that their measures are noisy. Instead, they define a board as 
busy if a majority of the outside directors have three or more board positions. 
Finally, Jackling and Johl (2009) use two measures of board busyness. The first 
measure of board busyness is the average number of directorships held by both inside and 
outside directors of a firm. The second measure is the average number of director 
positions held by outside directors of the firm. 
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As this study is indirectly examining the monitoring capabilities of outside board 
members, the second Jackling and Johl (2009) measure is used. Thus, outside director 
busyness is measured as the average number of director positions held by outside 
directors of the firm. The outside director busyness variable is collected for the prior year 
from 1999 to 2006 and is sourced from Risk Metrics for US firms and from annual 
reports for UK firms. 
CEO duality is the third agency theory-related predictor of FDSA. The board of 
directors plays an important role as the watchdog for the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). The chairperson heads the group of board of directors. There may be a conflict of 
interest when the Chairperson is also the CEO (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Fizel & Louie, 
1990; Daynton, 1984). Furthermore, Westphal and Zajac (1995) suggest that a CEO who 
is also the Chairperson of the board may be more likely to select board members who will 
not challenge him/her. Following Boyd (1995), a dummy variable for CEO duality is 
created by coding 0 for separated CEO and Chair roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chair 
role. CEO duality data is collected annually from 1999-2006, lagged one year, and is 
sourced from Risk Metrics for US companies and annual reports for UK companies. 
Proxies for Principal-Principal Problems 
In this study, three variables are used to examine the impact of principal-principal 
problems on financially driven shareholder activism. The first variable is debt level, 
which is calculated by total debt divided by total assets. Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) 
used this measure in their study of CEO duality. Debt level is collected annually from 
Thompson One from 1999-2006 and is also lagged one year. 
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The second variable is blockholder ownership, which is defined as the 
percentage of ownership held by the stated blockholders. In the US, a blockholder owns 
a 5% or more equity stake in the company while in the UK, a blockholder owns 3% or 
more equity. Blockholder ownership data is collected annually from 1999 to 2006 
from Compact Disclosure for US companies and from annual reports for UK companies 
and is also lagged one year. 
The third variable, Pressure, is abbreviated for Pressure resistance by the top 
owner and is a 0/1 dummy variable created using the Brickley et al. (1988) typology. 
First, each top shareholder of each firm in the sample is identified. Then an internet 
search using Google is conducted to determine the type of owner and then finally 
categorized into two groups: pressure sensitive or pressure resistant. Pressure takes on 
the value of 0 when the top shareholder is pressure sensitive and is classified as either a 
mutual fund, insurance company, trust, or an insider owner and takes on a value of 1 
when the top owner is pressure resistant and is classified as a hedge fund, unaffiliated 
Corporation, private equity firm, or a pension fund. Pressure data is collected annually 
from 1999-2006 and is sourced from Compact Disclosure for US companies and from 
annual reports for UK companies. 
Dependent Variables 
Two dependent variables are used in this study: financially driven shareholder 
activism (FDSA) and changes in firm performance. 
Financially driven shareholder activism (FDSA). The variable FDSA is coded 
as both a dichotomous variable and a continuous variable. First, FDSA is collected using 
content analysis. A search for the keyword term "shareholder activism" for each 
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company was conducted for the years 2000 through 2007 using the Dow Jones Factiva 
Database. Two independent coders, the author and a Masters degree student, noted the 
date of the activism event, method of activism, goal of the activism, initiator of the 
activism, and the outcome of the activism. Inter-coder reliability was checked by having 
both coders evaluate the same 60 companies. After that process, results were compared 
and an inter-coder reliability of 92% was found. The two coders met to discuss 
discrepancies and arrive at a consensus to jointly recode data. After concluding that this 
coding scheme was reliable, the author coded 60 firms, and the coding assistant coded 
187 firms. 
In addition, the activism event was later coded into two categories: financially 
driven and non-financially driven activism. FDSA was coded two ways. First, FDSA is 
a dichotomous variable taking on a value of 0 if there is no FDSA and 1 if there is an 
incidence of FDSA. In addition, a continuous measure of FDSA was developed. FDSA 
count is defined as the total number of separate activism events designated by either 
distinct activism objectives or distinct activist parties. 
Long-term Firm Performance. For the second stage of the analysis measuring 
the effects of FDSA, measures for firm performance are required. Examining the 
literature, there is a multitude of ways to measure firm performance. First, many studies 
calculate short and longer term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon the 
announcement of the stock purchase by a blpckholder, the release of a focus list or a 
proxy resolution announcement (See Faulkner et al.,1990; Carleton et al., 1998; Gillan & 
Starks, 2000; Caton et al., 2001; Song & Szewczyk, 2003; English et al., 2004; Mulherin 
& Poulsen, 1998; Thomas et al., 2005; Nelson, 2005; Barber, 2006; Boyson & 
87 
Mooradian, 2007; Bratton, 2007; Greenwood & Schor, 2007; Croci, 2007; Becht et al., 
2009). Second, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) calculate Buy and Hold Returns 
(BAHRs) as the average three year total compounded returns of the targeted firm less 
three year compounded return of the control group. 
Third, numerous researchers calculate the year-over-year changes in accounting 
and market performance measures. As FDSAs are looking for positive changes in firm 
performance, this study follows Karpoff et al. (1996), Smith (1996), Bethel et al. (1998), 
Klein and Zur (2006), Boyson and Mooradian (2007) in the use of year over year changes 
in firm performance. 
Data is collected for one and two year changes in both financial and market based 
performance measures. Change in ROA is used as the accounting-based performance 
measure and change in Tobin's Q is used as the market-based performance measure. 
Following Smith (1996), all change performance measures are lagged one and two years 
after to being targeted by FDSA (which provides a longer term perspective than previous 
studies). Change in ROA is defined as ROA (t +1) minus ROA (t) divided by ROA (t >. 
Change in Tobin's Q is defined as Q (t+i) minus Q (t) divided by Q (t> Following 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Maury and Pajuste (2005), Tobin's Q is calculated as 
the ratio of the market value of assets over its book value of assets, where the market 
value of assets is computed as the book value of assets minus the book value of common 
equity plus the market value of common equity. Data is sourced from Thomson One and 
collected for each year from 2001-2008. 
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Control Variables 
Control variables are used in both antecedent and effects models. Nine control 
variables are used in the first set of models examining the antecedents of FDSA and most 
captured in the year prior (t-1): country, firm age, firm size, board size, prior firm 
performance, free cash flow, year of activism event and industry. As this is a two 
country study, a control variable is used to capture any effects of difference governance 
environments. Country is coded 0 if the target firm is US-based and 1 if the firm is UK-
based. Mishra, Rand0y, and Jenssen (2001) determined that firm age is an important 
determinant for business characteristics and company goals. Firm age is calculated by 
the total number of years since incorporation and is calculated by the difference between 
the year prior to the activism event and the firm's year of incorporation. Firm age data 
is sourced from Thomson One. Another control variable is firm size, which is measured 
by the log of book value of total assets. 
As Buchanan and Yang (2009) show a positive relationship between board size 
and activism in their sample of UK and US shareholder proposals, board size is included 
in the study as a control variable. Board size is defined as the total number of members 
that are on the board of directors. Data on board size is sourced from RiskMetrics for 
US companies and annual reports for UK companies. Board size is also captured in the 
year prior to the activism event. 
As prior performance has been shown to be an antecedent of shareholder 
activism, it is included in the study as a control variable and is measured by return on 
assets (ROA) and prior return. ROA is measured by Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization (EBIDTA) divided by total assets. As Cochran and 
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Wood (1984) suggest, accounting measures of performance are easily manipulated by 
managers, so a market measure of performance is also included. Return is total 
investment return and is defined as the year end market price plus dividends per share 
plus special dividends in each quarter divided by last year's end year market price minus 
one all multiplied by 100. All prior performance data is from 1999-2006 and is accessed 
from Thomson One. 
As free cash flow is often a proxy for agency problems, it is included as a control 
variable. Free cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation minus total 
income taxes plus deferred taxes from the previous year to the current year minus gross 
interest expense on debt minus dividends paid divided by book value of total assets. Free 
cash flow data is accessed from Thomson One. 
To control for the industry effects, eight indicator variables are used representing 
nine industries based on one-digit SIC classification. A control variable is created for 
year of the activism event by using eight variables with the year 2000 being the base 
category. 
Control variables for the second set of models testing the effects of FDSA on firm 
performance include country, firm age, firm size, debt level, free cash flow, year of 
FDSA and industry. All variables have similar operationalizations as above but are 
measured as t=0 variables and are matched to same year of the FDSA event. 
Moderators 
One moderator is used with the second set of analyses examining the impact of 
FDSA on changes in firm performance: FDSA x Country. FDSA x Country is an 
interaction term created by the multiplying FDSA by Country which will test the impact 
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of governance environment on the relationship between FDSA and changes in firm 
performance. 
Data Analysis 
As the data contains non-independent observations with cross-sectional, time 
series data, panel data analysis is employed using STATA 10.0, a statistical program. As 
the type of statistical analysis used depends on the nature of the dependent variable, 
several different types of panel data analyses are conducted. First, to test the antecedents 
of FDSA, a dichotomous variable, logistic regression for panel data is used (i.e., the 
XTLOGIT procedure in STATA). Second, to test the antecedents of FDSA Count, a 
continuous variable, poisson regression for panel data is used (ie. the XTPOISSON 
procedure in STATA). Third, to test the effects of FDSA on changes in firm 
performance, a continuous variable, regression for panel data is used (ie. the XTREG 
procedure in STATA). 
Summary 
In this chapter, the research design, sample, variables and their operationalizations 
were introduced and procedures for data analysis were described. In the next chapter, the 
results of the analysis will be presented. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
In this chapter, results of the statistical analyses are presented. First, descriptive statistics 
of the sample are introduced, followed by correlation and linearity analyses and the panel 
data regression analyses. Models are also adjusted to address any multi-co-linearity 
issues. Finally, a summary of hypotheses test results is presented. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample are presented in Table 6. Although the 
original sample was 100 US firms and 100 UK firms, data could be found on a total of 
187 firms, 94 in the US and 93 in the UK. These data on these 187 firms was collected 
for 8 years from 2000 to 2007, resulting in a total possible 1,488 observations. However, 
missing data reduced the sample to a maximum of 1,444 firm year observations. In 
addition, the t+2 year variables of 2 year change in ROA and 2 year change in Tobin's 
Q were limited by data availability reducing the section of analysis using t+2 variables to 
1,229 firm-year observations. 
For the full sample, the mean of FDSA is .05 indicating that most firms are not 
targeted by FDSA. Examining FDSA Count, it is apparent that some companies are 
targeted multiple times in one year by FDSAs. In Figure 2, FDSA and FDSA Count are 
shown by year. There was very little shareholder activism in the early years of the 
sample and both FDSA and FDSA Count have grown substantially since 2001. 
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FIGURE 2- INCIDENCE OF FDSA AND FDSA COUNT BY YEAR 
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In the full sample, firms in the sample experienced declines in mean market-based 
measures of financial performance and increases in accounting-based performance. The 
means for one and two year changes in Tobin's Q were -.04 and -.03 respectively, 
while the mean for one and two year changes in ROA were .48 and .49. In Tables 7 
and 8, descriptive statistics are presented for US and UK firms separately and some 
interesting differences are noted via t-test results in Table 9. 
First, there is significantly more FDSA in the US sample than in the UK sample 
with FDSA occurring in 8% of the firm year observations compared to just 3% in the UK 
(t = 4.14, p<.001). The intensity of FDSA is also much higher in the US with mean a 
FDSA count of 15% versus the UK's 4% and is also statistically significant (t = 3.96, 
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TABLE 9 - T-TESTS COMPARING MEANS OF KEY VARIABLES 
Variable 
FDSA 
FDSA Count 
Board Independence 
Outside Director busyness 
CEO duality 
Debt level 
BH Ownership 
Pressure 
Free Cash Flow 
Return 
Board size 
Firm age 
total assets 
ROA 
1 yr change in Tobin's Q 
2 yr change in Tobin's Q 
1 year change in ROA 
2 year change in ROA 
Mean 
0.08 
0.15 
0.84 
1.42 
0.84 
21.65 
0.26 
0.05 
0.05 
19.16 
11.30 
54.03 
40,987 
8.35 
-0.04 
-0.03 
0.48 
0.59 
Mean 
0.03 
0.04 
0.57 
2.21 
0.05 
26.40 
0.32 
0.13 
0.01 
19.88 
10.69 
48.91 
16,532 
7.47 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.22 
1.08 
T-Stat 
413 *** 
3.96 ** 
43.87 *** 
18.06 *** 
47.35 *** 
5.32 *** 
0.56 
5.00 *** 
4.78 *** 
0.14 
4.30 *** 
2.28 * 
7.58 *** 
1.97* 
1.66 f 
2.70 ** 
0.44 
0.51 
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p<.001). Examining mean changes in financial performance, changes in one and two 
year Tobin's Q are lower for US companies compared to the UK with approaching 
significance for changes in one year Tobin Q (t = 1.66, p<.10) and significant for changes 
in two year Tobin's Q (t = 2.70, p<.05). While mean changes in one and two year ROA 
are mixed, neither is statistically significant. In the US, the mean one year change in 
ROA is .48 compared to .22 for the UK and the mean two year change in ROI is .59 in 
the US compared to 1.08 in the UK. 
Examining the independent variables in the study, there are some noteworthy 
differences between the US and the UK sample. In the US, CEO duality is high with a 
mean of 85% of firms having the same person hold both CEO and chairperson of the 
board roles and this is highly significant (t = 47.35, p<.001). In contrast, just 5% of UK 
firms have CEO duality. In the US, boards are significantly more independent than in the 
UK with a mean ratio of outsiders to total directors of .84 versus .57 in the UK (t= 43.87, 
p<.001). UK boards are significantly busier boards with a mean of 2.21 outside 
directorships per outside board member compared to 1.42 in the US (t= 18.06, p<.001). 
UK boards are also smaller than US boards with a mean of 10.69 compared with 11.30 
for US firms (t= 4.30, p<.001). UK firms are more likely to have a pressure resistant top 
owner with a mean of .13 versus .25 for US firms and that finding is also significant (t= 
5.00, p<.001). While UK firms have a higher mean level of blockholder ownership than 
in the US with a mean of .32 versus .26 in the US, that finding is not statistically 
significant. 
Examining operating and profitability ratios, there are also significant differences 
between firms in the two countries. US firms operate with higher levels of free cash flow 
98 
with a mean of .05 compared to .01 in the UK (t= 4.78, p<.001). UK firms are more 
leveraged than US firms with a mean debt to asset ratio of 26.4 percent versus 21.65 
percent for US firms and that finding is highly significant (t= 5.32, p<.001). Comparing 
ROA, US firms have higher ROA with a mean of 8.35 percent versus 7.47 percent (t= 
1.97, p<.05) for UK firms. No significant differences in total investment return are 
found. 
Finally, looking at firm age and firm size, US firms are bigger and older than UK 
firms. Mean value of total assets for US firms is 40,987 versus 16,532 for UK firms (t= 
7.58, p<.001). US firms have been incorporated for a mean time frame of 54 years, while 
UK firms' mean is 49 years (t= 2.28, p<.05). 
These descriptive statistics support Aguilera, Williams, Conley and Rupp's 
(2006) contention that despite the similarities in governance structures, US and UK firms 
have substantial differences that signify a need for more studies contrasting US and UK 
firms. 
In addition, all variables were tested for normality using the STATA 10.0 
Skewness-Kurtosis test (sktest) and all variables are found to be normally distributed 
except for variable, firm size. Once the variable firm size is transformed by calculating 
the log of total assets, it is within normal limits. 
Correlation Analysis 
Next, correlations for all the variables included in the study are presented in Table 
10. Dummy variables for year and industry have not been included. There seem to be no 
major problems with multi-co-linearity as all correlations are under .9. There are a few 
variables, such as FDSA and FDSA Count, and 1 and 2 year change in ROA and 1 and 2 
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year change in Tobin's Q which are co-linear, but will not be used in the same analysis. 
Checking for multi-co-linearity, all independent and control variables have variance 
inflation factors (VIF) well under the suggested value of 10 with the highest value equal 
to 5.6. To ensure the results are robust, all models are rerun with the goal of keeping all 
VIF values under 4.0 and the results remain quantitatively similar (O'Brien, 2007). VIF 
values will be discussed as each set of analyses is presented. 
Panel Data Analysis 
Random effects panel data analysis was used throughout this study for several 
reasons. First, fixed effects logistic regression models use an unseen dummy variable for 
each panel data point that captures that firm's specific effect in the model. In firms that 
have had no incidence of FDSA, the dummy variable is co-linear with the dependent 
variable precluding a fixed-effects model from being generated. Second, fixed-effects 
models were run and Hausman tests support using random effects models. 
Six sets of analyses were run. In the first set of analyses, hypotheses relating to 
antecedents of FDSA were tested using a dichotomous dependent variable, FDSA. 
Second, antecedents of FDSA were tested using a continuous dependent variable, FDSA 
count. The third and fourth analyses tested the effects of FDSA on one and two year 
changes in market-based performance, and the fifth and sixth set of analyses tested the 
effects of the FDSA on one and two year changes in accounting-based performance. 
Additional analyses split the sample by country to examine the effects of FDSA on 
changes in market-based performance. 
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Antecedents of FDSA and FDSA Count 
The results of the panel data logistic regressions with FDSA as the dependent 
variable can be found in Table 11. Three models are built and tested in a hierarchical 
manner. In Model 1, only control variables including the dummy variables for year and 
industry are used. In Model 2, the six main effect variables are added. In Model 3, the 
model is adjusted to minimize multi-co-linearity with all variables having VIF values of 
less than 2.4 and an overall model mean VIF score of 1.32. Thus, comparing Model 2 
and Model 3, it can be demonstrated that the model remains robust. Furthermore, there 
are significant improvements to both Models 2 and 3 as indicated by changes in the Chi-
Square values and using a Chi-Square test of model fit. In addition, likelihood ratio tests 
indicate a significant improvement in model fit of Models 2 and 3. 
HI suggested that there would be a negative relationship between board 
independence and FDSA. In Model 2, the coefficient for board independence is not 
significant; therefore, HI is not supported. H2 posited a positive relationship between 
CEO duality and FDSA. Once again, our data show no support for H2. H3 stated that 
there would be a positive relationship between outside director busyness and FDSA. 
Again, the results show no support for H3. 
H4 predicted a negative relationship between debt levels and FDSA. No support 
was found for H4. H5 suggested that there would be a negative relationship between 
total blockholder ownership and FDSA. The coefficient of blockholder ownership is 
negative and significant, thus providing relatively strong support for H5 (Model 2: /? = -
4.162,/? < .01). H6 predicted a positive relationship between pressure resistant 
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TABLE 11 
PANEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF THE ANTECEDENTS OF FDSA 
Dependent Variable = FDSA 
Variable 
Controls: 
Country 
Firm Age 
log Firm Size 
Board Size 
ROA 
Return 
Free Cash Flow 
Year 
Industry 
Constant 
Main effects: 
Board independence 
Outside Director Busyness 
CEO duality 
Debt Level 
BH Ownership 
Pressure 
n= 1,288 
-2 log likelihood 
Model x2 
Ax2 
MODEL 1 
Coef. 
-0.431 
0.005 
0.916 *** 
-0.033 
0.034 t 
-0.013 ** 
-0.544 
Included 
Included 
-13.88 *** 
-217.6 
55.42 
S.E. 
0.460 
0.005 
0.206 
0.076 
0.021 
0.006 
0.810 
2.12 
*** 
MODEL 2 
Coef. 
0.221 
0.005 
0.815 *** 
-0.048 
0.007 
-0.012 * 
-0.838 
Included 
Included 
-14.338 *** 
3.174 t 
0.210 
-0.222 
-0.014 
-4.162 ** 
1.127 * 
-202.4 
66.23**; 
10.81 t 
S.E. 
0.820 
0.005 
0.210 
0.079 
0.024 
0.006 
0.809 
[ 
[ 
2.680 
2.129 
0.256 
0.503 
0.013 
1.560 
0.655 
MODEL 3 
Coef. 
0.005 
0 793 *** 
0.007 
-0.012 * 
-0.908 
Included 
Included 
-13.561 *** 
3.034 * 
0.216 
-0.261 
-0.016 
-3.828 ** 
1.061 f 
-203.2 
61.94*** 
6.52* 
S.E. 
0.005 
0.179 
0.024 
0.006 
0.829 
2.263 
1.748 
0.220 
0.461 
0.013 
1.496 
0.652 
f p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one-tailed) 
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ownership and FDSA. The coefficient of pressure is positive and significant. Thus, H6 
is supported by our data (Model 2: (5 = 1.127,/? < .05). 
The next set of regressions is run using FDSA Count as the dependent variable 
using a panel data Poisson regression. Table 12 reports the results. Model 1 contains just 
the control variables. Model 2 contains the control variables plus the six main effects. 
Model 2 variables have VIF values as high as 5.6. In Model 3, the model is adjusted to 
minimize multi-co-linearity with all variables having VIF values of less than 2.4 and an 
over model mean VIF score of 1.32. Thus, comparing Model 2 and Model 3, it can be 
demonstrated that the model remains robust. Unfortunately, there was no significant 
improvement of the fit in Models 2 and 3 as indicated by the 1.03 change in model Chi-
Square. Furthermore, the log ratio tests do not indicate a significant improvement in 
model fit. In this model, support is found for H5 (Model 2: /? = -3.328,/? < .01), which 
states that there should be a negative relationship between blockholder ownership and 
FDSA. No support for the other five hypotheses using FDSA Count as the dependent 
variable. 
Effects of FDSA 
The second part of the research model tests the remaining two hypotheses that 
utilize competing hypotheses to posit the effects of FDSA on changes in firm 
performance. Tables 13 reports the analyses in which the dependent variables are 1 year 
change in Tobin's Q and 2 year change in Tobin's Q. Six models are tested. For each 
dependent variable, models are built in a hierarchical fashion with control variables only 
in Models 1 and 4. Models 2 and 5 test the control variables plus main effects. Model 3 
and 6 test control variables, main effects, and interactions. In all three models, there are 
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TABLE 12 
PANEL DATA POISSON REGRESSION ANTECEDENTS OF FDSA COUNT 
Dependent Variable = 
Variable 
Controls: 
Country 
Firm Age 
log Firm Size 
Board Size 
ROA 
Return 
Free Cash Flow 
Year 
Industry 
Constant 
Main effects: 
Board independence 
Outside BOD Busyness 
CEO duality 
Debt Level 
BH Ownership 
Pressure 
n= 1,288 
-2 log likelihood 
Model x2 
AX2 
FDSA Count 
MODEL 1 
Coef. 
-0.635 t 
0.007 t 
0.912 *** 
-0.034 
0.028 ** 
-0.009 ** 
-0.758 
Included 
Included 
-13.719 *** 
-340.5 
76.24**: 
S.E. 
0.426 
0.004 
0.198 
0.057 
0.015 
0.004 
0.652 
2.107 
MODEL 2 
Coef. 
-0.297 
0.005 
0.910 *** 
-0.053 
0.012 
-0.009 ** 
-0.661 
Included 
Included 
-14.137 *** 
0.882 
0.242 
0.083 
0.007 
-3.328 ** 
0.786 
-324.2 
79.15 
2.91 
S.E. 
0.679 
0.005 
0.221 
0.060 
0.020 
0.004 
0.664 
2.598 
1.767 
0.224 
0.340 
0.012 
1.344 
0.691 
MODEL 3 
Coef. 
0.006 t 
0 97i *** 
0.012 
-0.009 * 
-0.759 
Included 
Included 
-14.372 *** 
1.654 
0.216 
0.108 
0.004 
-2.921 * 
0.711 
-327.3 
77.27 
1.03 
S.E. 
0.004 
0.203 
0.019 
0.004 
0.670 
2.305 
1.431 
0.220 
0.323 
0.012 
1.262 
0.663 
t p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one tailed) 
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no problems with multi-co-linearity as the mean VIF is 1.48 and all VIF values are under 
2.0. All models are significant at the P<.001 level. Chi-square difference tests only 
show significant model improvement in Model 5, but not Models 2, 3, or 6. 
H7a states that FDSA would have a positive effect on changes in firm 
performance while H7b posits the opposite effect. Examining the first three models, 
which test the effects on the one year change in market-based performance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, we find that the coefficient of FDSA is positive and approaching 
significance in Model 2 (Model 2: /? = .047, p < .10) and is highly significant in Model 3 
(Model 3: /? = .067,p < .01). Thus, H7a is supported with 1 year change in Tobin's Q. In 
Models 4 through 6, the dependent variable is 2 year change in Tobin's Q. Again, H7a is 
strongly supported (Model 2: p = .107,p < .05 and Model 3: fi = A25,p < .01), while no 
support is found for H7b. 
H8a and H8b posit that governance environment will moderate the relationship 
between FDSA and changes in firm performance. H8a predicts that the governance 
environment will moderate the relationship between FDSA and changes in firm 
performance and that the relationship would be positive and stronger in the US. H8b 
states that the governance environment will moderate the relationship between FDSA and 
changes in firm performance and that the relationship would be negative and stronger in 
the US. An interaction term was created by multiplying FDSA by Country. While the 
County and FDSA variables were both significant in Models 4-6, the interaction term was 
not significant. Thus, another set of tests were run by separating the sample by country 
and re-running the analysis with 1 year and 2 year changes in Tobin's Q as the dependent 
variable. Table 14 shows the effects by country on 1 year changes in Tobin's Q and 
Table 15 shows the effects on 2 year changes in Tobin's Q. 
In Table 14, Models 1 and 2 show the impact of FDSA on 1 year changes in 
Tobin's Q in US firms and Models 3 and 4 show similar results for UK firms. All four 
models are significant. However, chi-square model difference tests show significant 
improvement between Model 1 and 2, but not between Models 3 and 4. The coefficient 
for FDSA in US firms is positive and significant (Model 2: fi = .068, p < .05) and while 
there is no statistical support for any relationship between FDSA and changes in firm 
performance in the UK firm sample. The result indicates that there is a difference 
between countries in the FDSA-change in performance relationship and that the 
relationship is positive and stronger in the US. Thus, there is H8a is supported and H8b 
is not. Figure 3 shows the moderating effect of governance environment. As 
hypothesized in H8a, the impact of FDSA on the 1 year change in Tobin's Q is positive 
in the US and not in the UK. In the UK, the one year change in Tobin's Q as a result of 
FDSA is actually slightly negative, but not statistically significant. 
FIGURE 3 - 1 YEAR CHANGE IN TOBIN'S Q FOR US FIRMS 
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TABLE 14 - PANEL DATA REGRESSION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN FIRM 
PERFORMANCE BY COUNTRY 
Country: 
DV: 
Variable 
Controls: 
Firm Age 
log Firm Size 
Free Cash Flow 
Debt level 
Year 
Industry 
Constant 
Main effects: 
FDSA 
N 
R2 
Model %2 
A*2 
MODEL 1 
US 
1 yr A in Tobin's Q 
Coef. 
0.000 
-0.020 ** 
-0.353 ** 
0.002 ** 
Included 
Included 
0.087 
739 
30.45 
316.59*** 
S.E. 
0.000 
0.009 
0.151 
0.001 
0.097 
MODEL 2 
US 
1 yr A in Tobin'sQ 
Coef. 
0.000 
-0.023 ** 
-0.368 ** 
0.002 ** 
S.E. 
0.000 
0.010 
0.151 
0.001 
Included 
Included 
0.122 
0.068 * 
739 
30.84 
0.098 
0.034 
321 99*** 
5.4* 
MODEL 3 
UK 
1 yr A in Tobin'sQ 
Coef. S.E. 
0.000 0.000 
-0.006 0.008 
0.038 0.053 
-0.001 0.001 
Included 
Included 
-0.017 0.079 
676 
22.51 
191.43*** 
MODEL 4 
UK 
1 yr A in Tobin'sQ 
Coef. S.E. 
0.000 0.000 
-0.005 0.009 
0.038 0.053 
-0.001 0.001 
Included 
Included 
-0.020 0.080 
-0.014 0.067 
676 
22.51 
191.19*** 
-0.240 
f p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one-tailed) 
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Table 15 shows the results for 2 year changes in Tobin's Q. Models 1 and 2 tests 
the relationship between FDSA and 2 year changes in Tobin's Q in US firms while 
Models 3 and 4 test the same relationship in UK firms. All four models are significant at 
the p<.001 level. Chi square model difference tests indicate significant improvement 
between Models 1 and 2, but not Models 3 and 4. The coefficient for FDSA in US firms 
is positive and significant (Model 2: ft = 1.43,/? < .01) and there is no statistical support 
for any relationship between FDSA and changes in firm performance in the UK firm 
sample. Again, there is support for H8a but not for H8b in the US. 
Figure 4 shows the interaction effect graphically for US firms. As hypothesized 
in H8a, the impact of FDSA on the 2 year change in Tobin's Q is positive in the US and 
is stronger than the UK. In the UK, the two year change in Tobin's Q as a result of 
FDSA is not statistically significant. 
FIGURE 4- 2 YEAR CHANGE IN TOBIN'S Q FOR US FIRMS 
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TABLE 15 - PANEL DATA REGRESSION EFFECTS ON CHANGES IN FIRM 
PERFORMANCE BY COUNTRY 
DV: 
Country: 
Variable 
Controls: 
Firm Age 
log Firm Size 
Free Cash Flow 
Debt level 
Year 
Industry 
Constant 
Main effects: 
FDSA 
N 
R2 
Model x2 
Ax2 
2 yr A in Tobin'sQ 
MODEL 1 
US 
Coef. 
0.000 
-0.040 * 
-0.902 *** 
0.004 ** 
Included 
Included 
0.092 
646 
28.6 
S.E. 
0.001 
0.018 
0.233 
0.001 
0.185 
283.95*** 
MODEL 2 
US 
Coef. 
0.000 
-0.044 ** 
-0.935 *** 
0.004 ** 
S.E. 
0.001 
0.019 
0.232 
0.001 
Included 
Included 
0.140 
0.143 ** 
646 
29.29 
0.186 
0.050 
296.34*** 
12 39 *** 
MODEL 3 
UK 
Coef. S.E. 
0.000 0.000 
-0.014 0.013 
0.004 0.075 
-0.002 * 0.001 
Included 
Included 
0.046 0.124 
585 
21.55 
159.46*** 
MODEL 4 
UK 
Coef. S.E. 
0.000 0.000 
-0.015 0.014 
0.005 0.075 
-0.002 * 0.001 
Included 
Included 
0.050 0.125 
0.021 0.103 
583 
21.56 
159.31 
-0.150 
t p < .10 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, (all one-tailed) 
I l l 
Examining measures of accounting based performance, 6 additional models were 
tested and can be seen in Table 16. Models 1-3 used a dependent variable of 1 year 
change in ROA and Models 3-6 used a dependent variable of 2 year change in ROA. 
These results must be interpreted with caution as none of the six models had model 
significance as indicated by the low Model chi-square numbers. In addition, chi-square 
model difference tests show no improvements between Models 1,2, and 3 or Models 4, 
5, or 6. In all six models, no support was found for FDSA having either a positive or 
negative relationship with changes in accounting performance. Multi-co-linearity was 
not an issue as all variables in models 1-6 had VTF values well under the recommended 
4.0 with the highest VIF score of 2.4. Based on the low Model chi-square of accounting 
based performance, additional tests of H8a and H8b on changes in ROA are not 
significant and are not reported in this analysis. 
Conclusion 
Statistical support was found for H5, H6, H7a (using market-based measures of 
changes in performance, but not accounting-based measures) and H8a in the US, but not 
the UK (using market-based measures of changes in performance, but not accounting-
based measures) but not for HI, H2, H3 or H7b or H8b using FDSA. Statistical support 
was found for H5 using FDSA Count as the dependent variable. Table 17 summarizes 
the hypotheses, predicted relationships and statistical findings. In the next chapter, 
results of the study will be discussed in greater detail. 
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TABLE 17 - SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS 
H# THEORY 
ANTECEDENTS 
HI P-A 
H2 P-A 
H3 P-A 
H4 P-P 
H5 P-P 
H6 P-P 
EFFECTS 
H7a P-A 
H7b P-P 
VARIABLE 
Independence 
Outside Director Busyness 
CEO Duality 
Debt level 
Blockholder ownership 
Pressure Resistance of 
Dominant Owner 
FDSA 
FDSA 
PREDICTED 
RELATIONSHIP 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
Negative 
FINDINGS 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Supported 
Supported 
Supported 
Not supported 
MODERATORS 
H8a P-A Governance Environment Stronger pos. rel in US Supported 
H8b P-P Governance Environment Stronger neg. rel. in US Not supported 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the study objectives are reviewed and the results of the empirical analyses 
presented in Chapter IV are discussed. Theoretical and methodological contributions are 
outlined and managerial and policy implications are discussed. Finally, a discussion of 
the study limitations and opportunities for future research are presented. 
Study Objectives 
The objective of the study was to examine the antecedents and effects of 
financially driven shareholder activism in the US and the UK using an empirical analysis. 
Three research questions were introduced in Chapter I. First, what firm characteristics 
are causing firms to be targeted by financially driven shareholder activism? Second, does 
financially driven shareholder activism impact firm performance? Third, does governance 
environment moderate the relationship between shareholder activism and firm 
performance? This study also tested two competing perspectives in the context of 
shareholder activism: principal-agent and principal-principal. The literature was 
reviewed in Chapter II and eight hypotheses were developed and tested. 
Using agency theory as a theoretical foundation, shareholder activism is the result 
of dissatisfied shareholders concerned about conflicts of interest between principal and 
agents and unhappiness with the level of monitoring by the board of directors. On the 
other hand, the principal-principal perspective would suggest that shareholder activism is 
the result of shareholders attempting to extract resources from the firm at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Half of the hypotheses in this study tested agency theory and the 
other half tested the principal-principal perspective. Eight hypotheses were empirically 
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tested using a longitudinal sample of 187 firms over eight years from 2000 to 2007 with a 
final sample of 1,444 firm years. The incidence of firms being targeted by FDSAs was 
captured via content analysis of news articles appearing in Factiva. 
Summary of Findings 
This study yielded a number of noteworthy results. Hypotheses 1-3 tested the 
principal-agent perspective by examining whether agency problems due to board issues 
could be predictors of FDSA. If shareholders were unhappy with firm management, it 
might lead them to engage in FDSA as a mechanism to increase the monitoring of firm 
managers. Three governance measures were tested: board independence, outside director 
busyness, and CEO duality. Empirical results showed no support any of the first three 
hypotheses. Interestingly, the hypothesis on board independence was statistically 
significant but in the opposite direction as hypothesized. This finding conflicts with 
previous research that suggests that board independence would lead to increased 
monitoring of the firm and, thus, prevent FDSA. In this study, independent boards are 
more likely to be targeted by FDSA. In conclusion, it would suggest that principal-agent 
theory is a weak predictor of FDSA. It can also be argued that these three variables are 
not good measures of governance. This will be discussed in greater detail in the 
limitations and future research section of the paper. 
The biggest contribution of the study revolves around the testing of the principal-
principal perspective in a developed country setting. All prior studies have assumed that 
principal-principal conflicts only occur in emerging markets (Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; 
Kim, Kim & Lee, 2008; Su et al., 2008; Young et al., 2008; Ward & Filatotchev, 2009). 
Two of the three hypotheses relating to principal-principal perspective were supported as 
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being predictors of FDSA. Hypothesis 4 suggested that low debt levels would make a 
firm more attractive to a FDSA because of the potential of increasing leverage within the 
firm to be used for cash payouts and asset sales. This hypothesis was not supported. The 
next two hypotheses related to ownership structure. Hypothesis 5 posited that total 
ownership percentage by blockholders will be negatively related to FDSA. Using the 
principal-principal perspective, activists will not target firms who already have a 
significant amount of blockholders as the opportunity to mandate changes is most likely 
diminished. Empirical results show a significant negative relationship between the 
percentage of blockholder ownership of the firm and FDSA. This finding supports the 
principal-principal perspective that not all shareholders are the same and that large 
blockholders potentially wield more power than other shareholders. High levels of 
blockholder ownership diminish the probability of firms being targeted by FDSA. The 
next hypothesis suggested that type of blockholder was an important factor predicting 
FDSA. Not all blockholders are alike in that some have inherent conflicts of interest that 
prevent them from putting pressure on firm management. Using the Brickley et al. 
(1988) typography which classifies shareholders as pressure sensitive or pressure 
resistant, it was hypothesized that concentrated ownership by a pressure resistant investor 
would be an important predictor of FDSA. Under the principal-principal perspective, 
FDSAs would not target a firm if the top owner was pressure sensitive and unwilling to 
confront firm management. Hypothesis six was supported; FDSAs who are trying to 
target firms with the potential for expropriation recognize that pressure sensitive top 
owners may support top management and not yield to mandates from FDSAs. All in all, 
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the principal-principal perspective did a much better job in identifying the predictors of 
FDSA than did the principal-agent perspective. 
While support for the principal-principal perspective was found on the 
antecedents of FDSA, the principal-agent perspective is more relevant when examining 
the impact of FDSA on changes in firm performance. Hypotheses 7 examined the effects 
of FDSA on changes in firm performance. Again, principal-agent and principal-principal 
perspectives were tested in competing hypotheses. Four measures of financial 
performance were used: one and two year changes in market-based performance using 
Tobin's Q and one and two year changes in accounting-based performance using ROA. 
While no support was found for changes in accounting-based performance, results were 
significant for one and two year changes in Tobin's Q based on Hypothesis 7a which 
tested a principal-agent prediction. Thus, findings indicate that FDSA does lead to 
improvements in market-based performance. In the full sample, results show that firms 
targeted by FDSAs had a 6.7% one year increase in Tobin's Q and a 12.5% two year 
increase in Tobin's Q. Furthermore, these results support numerous studies that have 
found a positive relationship between shareholder activism and market-based 
performance (Nesbitt, 1994; Opler & Sobokin, 1998; Anson et al., 2003; Barber 2006; 
Boyson & Mooradian, 2007; Croci, 2007; Bessler et al., 2008; Buchanan & Young, 
2009). This finding is important as it suggests that FDSA is recognized by the market as 
being a mechanism to curb agency problems in the firm and that the market perceives 
FDSA to be a positive action. 
Thus, there is a distinct disconnect between the antecedents of FDSA and the 
effects of FDSA. All the drivers of FDSA were principal-principal related yet the effects 
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of FDSA support the principal-agent perspective. There could be many reasons for these 
results. First, investors still perceive that there is value in a vocal shareholder targeting a 
firm with FDSA and investors respond by driving up value of the stock, which increases 
the value of Tobin's Q. Empirical results support this as findings of short-term stock 
spikes after the announcements of activism are well documented in the literature 
(Faulkner et al., 1990; Strickland et al., 1996; Anson et al., 2003; Klein & Zur, 2006; 
Renneboog & Sazilagyi, 2006 and others). There may be perceptions that shareholder 
activists will take actions to benefit all shareholders and thus, FDSA efforts are embraced 
by the market. Second, while results show a positive relationship between FDSA and 
market-based performance, there was no support of any relationship between FDSA and 
accounting-based performance. The lack of support for hypotheses testing the effects 
FDSA on changes in accounting-based performance is not surprising as there are so many 
variables that contribute to a firm's accounting-based performance and accounting-based 
performance can easily be manipulated by managers. 
The last hypothesis examined the role of governance environment as a moderator 
between FDSA and change in financial performance. Again competing hypotheses were 
constructed testing principal-agent and principal-principal perspectives. Hypothesis 8a 
was supported, which posited that the FDSA change in firm performance relationship 
would be positive and stronger in the US than in the UK. For both one and two year 
changes in Tobin's Q, empirical results support the principal-agent perspective, but not 
the principal-principal perspective. Results show a one year increase in Tobin's Q of 
6.8% and a two year increase of 14.3% for US firms. There are a few implications from 
these findings. First, findings show that the governance environment does matter and 
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that change in both one and two year Tobin's Q was significantly higher in the US than in 
the UK. Second, the findings of this study add evidence to Aguilera et al. (2006) and 
Toms and Wright (2005) studies that argue that there are unique differences between the 
US and the UK even though both represent Anglo-American governance systems. 
Specifically, descriptive statistics from this study show that there is significantly more 
FDS A in the US and UK and that many other governance variables such as board 
independence, outside director busyness, and CEO duality were significantly different 
across the two countries. Again, principal-agent theory is a better predictor of FDS A 
effects on changes in firm performance. 
Theoretical and Methodological Contributions 
For scholars, this dissertation makes many theoretical and methodological 
contributions to the literature on shareholder activism. First, this research is one of the 
few studies on shareholder activism that incorporates a multi-country sample. Results 
support prior studies that show that governance environment is important and supports 
the Aguilera et al. (2006) finding that US investors are more impatient that UK 
institutional investors and turn over their portfolios more quickly. Second, this research is 
the first study to test the principal-principal perspective in firms from developed 
countries. Previous work has suggested principal-principal conflicts only occur in 
emerging markets (Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Kim, Kim & Lee, 2008; Su et al., 2008; 
Young et al., 2008; Ward & Filatotchev, 2009). While Shleifer and Vishny (1986) write 
that large shareholders have the potential of expropriation, this study provides 
preliminary evidence that the threat of expropriation does exist in developed countries 
like the UK and US. Furthermore, many studies take for granted the dispersed ownership 
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of UK and US firms without realizing that there have been tremendous growth in 
institutional ownership in both the US and the UK with institutional investor ownership 
in the US reached over 60% by 2005 (Gillan & Starks (2007) and UK institutional 
investor ownership is even higher at over 80% (ONS, 2007). This is the first study that 
provides some evidence that institutional investors are growing powerful enough to cause 
principal-principal problems within firms in developed countries. Third, agency theory 
and the principal-agent perspective have been used extensively in the strategy and finance 
literature. Researchers are starting to suggest that agency theory is limited in its 
explanatory power and that other theories need to be developed to explain firm behavior. 
Institutional theory and the principal-principal perspective add unique insight to the role 
of ownership structure as a key internal governance mechanism (Denis & McConnell, 
2003). Indeed, findings show that ownership structure via both blockholder ownership 
and type of owner are both important drivers of FDSA. The findings support Round 
(1976) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000), who argue that type of owner is equally as 
important as ownership share. This study's findings also contribute to the ownership 
structure research in that the Brickley et al. (1998) typology is tested in the setting of 
shareholder activism and findings show that shareholder activists target firms with 
pressure resistant dominant owners. Finally, the study made two methodological 
contributions. First, the study employed a longitudinal panel data sample tracking 
shareholder activism over eight years from 2000 to 2007. Most prior studies relied on 
matched pair samples. Second, following Judge et al (2010), this study separated 
incidences of shareholder activism into financially driven and socially-driven shareholder 
activism. 
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Managerial and Investor Implications 
The findings of this study may be of interest to both managers and investors. For 
managers, they should be aware that shareholder activism has grown significantly since 
the early 2000s and that it is not likely to go away. This study shows why certain firms 
are more likely to be targeted by shareholder activists. First, findings support numerous 
studies that show that poor prior performance attracts the attention of shareholder 
activists (Bethel et al 1998; Bizjak & Marquette, 1998; Mulherin & Poulsen, 1998; Choi, 
2000; Thomas et al., 2005; Croci, 2007; Becht et al., 2009 and others). Shareholder 
activism may be one of the first red flags that go up alerting other investors and managers 
that there are problems with firm performance. Second, firm managers must pay more 
attention to its ownership structure. They must recognize the growing power of both 
blockholder owners and of pressure resistant dominant owners. Given that FDSAs target 
firms with low blockholder ownership and firms with a pressure resistant dominant 
owner, some activists may have ulterior motives to gain power and control that may not 
be in the best interests of the firm. As Kulpa (2005) asserts, shareholder activists may be 
wolves in sheep's clothing and that firm managers need to handle shareholder activists 
with care. Firms need to be mindful of the needs of minority shareholders and balance all 
shareholders' interests. 
Last, findings of this study show that managing shareholder activism is made 
more difficult as SAs currently have the support of the larger investment community, 
which reacts positively to announcements of FDSA as shown by one and two year 
increases in market-based performance. Firm management must work quickly to 
address shareholder concerns, while continuing to be skeptical of shareholder activists' 
true motives. 
This paper can provide some guidance to firms on how to avoid being targeted by 
shareholder activists in the future. More specifically, if managers operate with high 
levels of disclosure, they may be less apt to be pressured by powerful FDS As like hedge 
funds. Hedge funds are a powerful investor group and must be treated with care. 
Furthermore, this study provides some evidence that managers need to take shareholder 
activism seriously. Managers need to institute governance reviews to make sure that 
solid corporate governance standards and policies are in place and that good relationships 
are developed with key shareholders. Firm managers need to be approachable and listen 
to shareholders before activism becomes more aggressive. They also need to be 
cognizant that minority shareholders, especially individual investors, also have a stake in 
the company and that their needs should be evaluated as well. 
The findings of this dissertation may be of interest to investors as well. First, the 
findings may encourage more types of investors to engage in shareholder activism 
especially if investors see positive gains from activism. This study reports one and two 
year market-based performance increases of 6.7% and 12.5%, respectively, as a result of 
FDS A. Second, investors may engage in increased bandwagon activities by joining in 
concert with other activists. Smaller investors should be increasingly wary of a firm's 
institutional investor base and how that base may be impacting company decision-
making. A large blockholder base has the ability to exert a significant amount of control 
over management. Furthermore, investors may want to take a closer look at the type of 
dominant owner as the appearance of pressure-resistant dominant owners impacts the 
level of FDSA in the firm. 
Policy Implications 
This dissertation provides policymakers with a number of interesting results 
which may lead to a re-examination of governance laws and practices in both the UK and 
the US. First, shareholder activism continues to grow in the UK, US and all around the 
world. Policymakers need to consider what role shareholder activism should play within 
their overall governance system (Judge et al., 2010). Clearly, some shareholders are 
unhappy, yet continue to hold their shares despite their dissatisfaction with firm 
management. While Romano (2001:3) suggests that shareholder activism and "fill the 
void in managerial monitoring" and Dalton et al. (2003:373) note that "shareholder 
activism is designed to encourage executives and directors to adopt practices that insulate 
shareholders from managerial self-interest by providing incentives for executives to 
manage firms in shareholders' long-term interests," findings of this study show that the 
motivations of shareholder activism are larger than simply addressing agency problems 
within the firm. A key finding of this study is that FDSA is not driven by agency 
problems, but more by principal-principal problems. 
Second, as findings suggest that principal-principal problems are drivers of 
FDSA, policymakers need to consider the role of the legal environment. Denis and 
McConnell (2003) identify the legal environment is an important external governance 
mechanism along with the market for corporate control. Thus, policymakers need to 
examine whether there is enough protection for minority shareholders and consider 
strengthening laws to protect them. There is some evidence that the UK provides its 
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smaller shareholders more rights through EGMs and binding proxy resolutions (Aguilera 
et al., 2006). US policymakers may want to look at increasing shareholder rights of 
investors. For example, US policymakers could consider making changes to the proxy 
resolution process to give shareholders greater ability to vote out board of director 
members in making it easier for dissatisfied shareholders to call an Extraordinary General 
Meeting (EGM). 
Third, policymakers need to be aware of the growth trends in institutional 
ownership in the US and the UK and the potential for increased principal-principal 
conflicts. Findings of this study show that FDSAs are targeting firms that have a high 
potential for expropriation. This finding supports Morck et al. (2005), who argue that 
concentrated ownership can cause misalignment of interests between the dominant 
shareholders and the minority shareholders. Policymakers in the US and UK need to 
continuously monitor the growth of institutional investor holdings. Developed countries 
are starting to look like emerging markets with increasing power of more concentrated 
ownership base. Policymakers may need to revisit whether powerful, yet currently 
unregulated hedge funds need additional oversight and regulation. Increasing domination 
of blockholder ownership could be a concern going forward. In addition, the Brickley et 
al. (1988) typology provides interesting perspective on the power base of pressure 
resistant dominant owners. 
Fourth, with data on the US and the UK, policymakers can examine how different 
corporate governance environments impact the level of shareholder activism and the 
effects of shareholder activism in each country. The UK provides its shareholders a more 
shareholder friendly governance environment which deters FDSA, while the US has been 
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reluctant to make voluntary or mandatory changes to corporate governance policy. As a 
result, there is much more shareholder activism in the US than in the UK. 
Last, making changes to improve governance may not be that easy. The study 
found that governance practices of board independence, outside director busyness, and 
CEO duality had no impact on the level of shareholder activism. Thus, policymakers 
need to delve deeper to better develop measures of what good corporate governance 
looks like. UK policymakers may want to re-examine their voluntary codes of corporate 
governance that mandate CEO duality. Even the UK is known for more involved 
governance standards, the UK still has busier boards and less board independence than 
the US. Dalton et al. (2003) suggest that the principal-agent perspective is limited and 
that board oversight is important, but it is not being measured by CEO duality or board 
independence. Furthermore, Forbes and Milliken state that: 
The influence of board demography on firm performance may not be simple and 
direct, as many past studies presume, but, rather, complex and indirect. To 
account for this possibility, researchers must begin to explore more precise ways 
of studying board demography that account for the role of intervening processes 
(1999: 490). 
Thus, policymakers will need to delve deeper to determine what makes good corporate 
governance. This is only complicated as Aguilera (2005) notes that even defining good 
governance is difficult to do. In summary, policymakers cannot depend on shareholder 
activism to be the next mechanism to solve problems of corporate governance. 
Study Limitations and Future Research 
There were limitations to this paper that could be improved in future research 
studies. First, there are distinct challenges to studying shareholder activism. For 
example, it can be especially difficult to make causal links between shareholder activism 
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and outcomes such as firm performance as there are many variables that influence firm 
performance and changes in governance. In addition, much shareholder activism is 
informal, behind closed doors negotiation that is hard to capture and study empirically. 
This study used content analysis to capture the incidence of the formal FDSA, but clearly, 
not all incidences of shareholder activism including informal activism were captured. 
There is only one study that has looked at informal activism (Becht et al., 2009). There 
may be other methods that will allow researchers to collect more precise measures of 
shareholder activism. For example, future studies should consider building a larger 
database of activism from not only news reports, but proxy resolutions and Schedule 13D 
filings. A larger database would provide additional insight on which types of activism 
work best. In addition, there are always limitations to the use of archival data. Studies 
like the Becht et al. (2009) study, which were able to get inside access to a shareholder 
activist's operations enabled them to obtain a deep understanding of the motivations and 
actions of the Hermes UK Focus Fund. 
Second, while this study made the distinction between financially driven and 
socially driven shareholder activism, this study's definition of FDSA is still extremely 
broad. Future research could focus on specific aspects of shareholder dissatisfaction such 
as compensation, governance, strategic and operational issues. 
Third, this study relied on both dummy and continuous variables to capture 
whether a firm was being targeted by a FDSA. However, this study did not examine any 
details on the activists themselves. Most prior studies on shareholder activism 
concentrate on one type of activist, such as hedge fund, pension fund, or blockholder 
activists and one type of activism method (proxy resolution, announcement of being put 
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on target list). There is anecdotal evidence that hedge funds may be contributing the 
most to principal-principal problems within the firm with their aggressive techniques 
(Kulpa, 2005). Future studies on shareholder activism should examine which type(s) of 
shareholder activist(s) achieve the most results (positive or negative) and which type(s) of 
activist(s) contribute the most to principal-principal conflicts within a target firm. 
Fourth, with the results of the study suggesting that there are principal-principal 
conflicts in firms from developed countries, additional work needs to be done to examine 
the extent of principal-principal problems in firms in developed versus developing 
economies. Prior research using the principal-principal perspective has focused on 
principal-principal conflicts in firms in emerging economies (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Su 
et al., 2008; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Chen & Young, 2010; Jiang & Peng, 2010; Peng & 
Jiang, 2010). More research needs to be done to examine just how FDSAs expropriate 
resources. As principal-principal problems were found in the context of shareholder 
activism, there may be other areas where principal-principal conflicts emerge in firms 
from developed economies. More studies focusing on the growth of institutional 
investors is needed. 
Fifth, there are opportunities to build on the Brickley et al. (1988) typology 
examining ownership type. As type of owner was relevant in the study of antecedents of 
shareholder activism, the same framework can be used in other research settings. 
Sixth, while agency theory is intuitively appealing, some of the traditional agency 
measures, such as CEO duality, board size, board independence and outside director 
busyness are relatively superficial proxies that attempt to identify the existence of 
monitoring problems within the firm (Dalton et al., 2003). The measure of CEO duality 
does not take into account the presence of lead outside directors that can play a role to 
mitigate the power of combined CEO/Chair role. Additional research should focus on 
more longitudinal case studies to determine how boards work and which boards are most 
effective at monitoring and providing guidance on strategy issues. 
Finally, this study only examined firms within an Anglo-American governance 
system. It would be interesting to expand the scope of this study to examine the 
antecedents and effects of shareholder activism in other countries with different 
governance environments. 
Conclusion 
Shareholder activism is a growing phenomenon around the world. While it 
provides a mechanism for shareholders to express their dissatisfaction with upper 
management, there is a darker side to the drivers of shareholder activism in that powerful 
activists may use shareholder activism as a method to expropriate resources from target 
firms. In regard to the effects of FDSA, there was no impact on changes in accounting 
performance, but a significant positive impact on changes in market based performance. 
This finding suggests that there could be market inefficiencies at play as investors place 
value on shareholder activism efforts. 
As Monks and Minow (1996) suggest, there is no ideal corporate governance 
system as all are failing in their attempt to balance shareholder and stakeholder interests. 
John Carver, a noted governance expert states that, "governance theory will not be a 'one 
size fits all' prescription as to structure and composition, but a coherent framework of 
fundamental, global principles upon which each board's individual practices can be left 
to vary in recognition of contextual and cultural particulars" (2010:150). 
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In summary, this study directly tested the principal-agent perspective and the 
principal-principal perspective in the unique setting of financially driven shareholder 
activism. Results show that the principal-principal problems in target firms were better 
predictors of FDSA than principal-agent problems. However, agency theory was more 
effective in predicting the effects of FDSA on changes in market-based performance. 
These findings open up doors for additional research of principal-principal problems 
primarily amongst dominant owners. Finally, this study provides evidence that 
governance environment is important. Key differences in governance found between the 
US and the UK provides additional evidence that governance environment plays a crucial 
role in the impact of FDSA on firm performance. To conclude, this study makes a 
significant contribution to the literature on corporate governance and shareholder 
activism and will hopefully generate additional research on these issues. 
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APPENDIX A 
CODE BOOK FOR CODERS 
• Date of article 
• Date of activism event 
• Target of the activism - Company targeted 
• Reason or goal of activism 
• Who initiated the activism 
o Name of activist 
o Type of activist 
• Pension fund 
• Hedge fund 
• Mutual fund 
• Individual investor 
• Blockholders activists 
• Shareholders 
• Other 
• Ownership of activist 
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